772 F. Supp. 2d 903
M.D. Tenn.2011Background
- Plaintiff Adrienne Trice filed suit in Robertson County Circuit Court (Feb 23, 2010) against Colleen McEachen and Chet Mason in their individual capacities asserting First Amendment retaliation (§1983) and malicious prosecution; case removed to federal court.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing (a) qualified immunity on the §1983 claim because indictments establish probable cause and lack of retaliatory motive, and (b) no malicious-prosecution liability since they did not initiate prosecution or influence charging decisions.
- Defendants also argued they did not participate in charging decisions and that Morriss (DA) alone decided prosecution and drafted indictments; Morriss asserts probable cause existed.
- The court addresses standard for summary judgment, reviews qualified-immunity two-step framework (Pearson clarified), and concludes defendants are entitled to summary judgment on §1983 retaliation and on the state-law malicious-prosecution claim.
- Factual background shows alleged unannounced home visit, sworn statement process, involvement of TBI, and that the DA’s office drafted the indictments; the court finds no evidence of personal involvement by McEachen or Mason in prosecutorial decisions.
- Conclusion: the court grants summary judgment for defendants, dismissing Trice’s complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on §1983 claim | Trice asserts retaliation for First Amendment activity. | Indictment establishes probable cause; no retaliatory motive proven. | Yes; qualified immunity applies; no constitutional violation proven. |
| Whether indictment establishes lack of probable cause for retaliation claim | Probable cause should be questioned, not assumed from indictment. | Indictment by grand jury conclusively determines probable cause. | Yes; probable cause conclusively determined by indictment; no §1983 violation. |
| Whether Defendants liable for malicious prosecution under Tennessee law | Defendants contributed to initiating prosecution through information provided. | Defendants did not initiate or influence charging decisions; DA alone decided. | No; defendants not liable; not responsible for initiation or drafting of indictments. |
| Whether any other basis defeats qualified immunity or supports liability | Claims arise from conduct during investigation and interview. | No constitutional violation; actions accordingly insulated. | No further liability; immunity retained. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (U.S. 2006) (probable-cause requirement for retaliatory-prosecution claims; causation hinges on absence of probable cause)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (two-step qualified-immunity analysis (now modifiable by Pearson))
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (permission to exercise discretion in sequencing two qualified-immunity steps)
- Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2002) (grand-jury indictment conclusive on probable cause in retaliation context)
- Hansen v. City of Oberlin, NA (NA) ((excluded; placeholder not used))
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard: genuine issue of material fact)