TRI-M GROUP, LLC v. Sharp
638 F.3d 406
| 3rd Cir. | 2011Background
- Delaware regulation imposes apprenticeship wage and training standards on all sponsors, tying apprentice wages to Delaware-registry status and requiring a permanent Delaware office for sponsors.
- Tri-M Group, PA-based contractor, bid on a Delaware state-funded project and paid Pennsylvania-registered apprentices at Delaware apprentice rates, while other workers were paid according to mechanic rates.
- Delaware Department of Labor inspected the project, found Tri-M not registered as a Delaware sponsor, and demanded wage corrections and reimbursement to affected apprentices.
- Tri-M sued for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the DPWR and ATRR as facially discriminatory against out-of-state contractors under the negative Commerce Clause.
- District Court granted summary judgment for Tri-M; the Third Circuit reviewed the market-participant issue and dormant Commerce Clause analysis on appeal.
- The Third Circuit ultimately held that Delaware acted as a market regulator, not a market participant, and the regulation violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the market-participant exception applies | Tri-M: DDOL is not a pure market participant; regulations regulate the market overall. | Sharp: DDOL acts as a market participant by promoting Delaware wages for work in state contracts. | No; market-participant exception does not apply. |
| Whether the Delaware scheme violates the Dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory or burdens interstate commerce | Tri-M: Residency/registration requirements discriminate against out-of-state contractors. | Sharp: Regulations apply to all sponsors; no discrimination; serves local interests. | Discriminatory on its face; per se invalid under heightened scrutiny. |
| Whether Congress expressly authorized the discriminatory regulation | Tri-M: Fitzgerald Act and USDOL approvals authorize the scheme; discrimination is permitted. | Sharp: There is no unmistakably clear congressional authorization for discrimination. | Congress did not expressly authorize the discrimination; regulation invalid. |
Key Cases Cited
- Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2005) (stricter scrutiny for discriminatory state laws; protectionist effects require justification)
- White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (U.S. 1983) (market-participant threshold and in-state biases in public contracts)
- Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Burns & Roe, 426 U.S. 792, 426 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1976) (market-participant exception case; state acts as purchaser to affect market)
- Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 427 (U.S. 1980) (state as market participant in distribution decisions)
- Boston Harbor Assocs. v. Massachusetts, 507 U.S. 119 (U.S. 1993) (market-participant analysis in procurement and labor conditions)
- Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (state regulation of apprenticeship wages as public-works public policy)
- Keystone Chapter, Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 1994) (state objective to set labor standards within police powers)
- Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (U.S. 1992) (limits of market-participant when state also regulates private market)
