Trevor Stefano v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections and Earl Houser, in an official capacity, 539 P.3d 497

Department of Corrections regulation makes prisoners eligible for discretionary furlough if they are within three years of the "firm release date," and defines "firm release date" to include dates established by parole board action.
In 2016 the Department treated a Parole Board discretionary-parole release date as a "firm release date;" Stefano relied on that policy and was released on furlough in 2018.
In 2019 the Department announced it would no longer treat discretionary-parole release dates as "firm release dates," denied Stefano furlough after he was remanded, and denied his administrative grievance.
Stefano sued under the Alaska Administrative Procedures Act (APA), arguing the Department narrowed the regulatory definition without adopting the change through required rulemaking; he attached a 2016 memorandum and a 2019 email evidencing the policy change.
The superior court granted summary judgment for the State, deeming the change a "common-sense interpretation" not requiring rulemaking; the Supreme Court reversed, holding the Department altered its prior interpretation in a way that affected prisoners’ rights and therefore had to follow APA rulemaking procedures.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Department’s 2019 change to the definition of "firm release date" constituted a "regulation" requiring APA rulemaking	Stefano: The Department narrowed the regulatory definition (excluding discretionary-parole dates), which altered prior official policy and therefore required formal rulemaking.	State: The change was a commonsense interpretation or internal management decision about discretionary furlough eligibility and did not alter rights such that rulemaking was required.	The Court held the change altered the agency’s prior interpretation and materially affected inmates’ interests, so it was a regulation that required APA rulemaking; summary judgment for the State was reversed and the case remanded.
Whether prisoners are "members of the public" for purposes of the APA	Stefano: Prisoners are members of the public and entitled to APA protections when agency actions affect their rights.	State: Prisoners are not properly considered members of the public for APA purposes (implicit argument).	The Court rejected the State’s position, treating prisoners as members of the public for APA purposes and noting prior precedent doing the same.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25 (Alaska 2016) (articulates test for when agency action is a regulation requiring rulemaking)
State, Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Nondalton Tribal Council, 268 P.3d 293 (Alaska 2012) (distinguishes nonbinding planning guidance from regulations that alter rights)
Jerrel v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 999 P.2d 138 (Alaska 2000) (agencies cannot evade rulemaking by labeling substantive actions as informal)
AVCG, LLC v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 527 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2023) (clarifies when applying existing standards avoids rulemaking versus when new interpretations require it)
Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 254 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2011) (discusses practical limits on requiring rulemaking for routine agency action)
Kachemak Bay Watch, Inc. v. Noah, 935 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1997) (framework for when agency planning documents constitute regulations)
Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013) (recognizes prisoners’ procedural protections in furlough decisions)