Tresa Megenity v. David Dunn
2017 Ind. LEXIS 109
| Ind. | 2017Background
- Megenity, a black-belt karate student, volunteered in a large mixed-level class to hold a padded bag during a "kicking-the-bag" drill.
- Dunn, a green belt, executed a jump kick (both feet leaving the ground) while running to Megenity’s bag; the kick struck the bag with force, knocking Megenity to the floor and injuring her knee.
- Megenity sued Dunn for negligence, alleging negligent, reckless, and unreasonable conduct; Dunn moved for summary judgment.
- Dunn argued, relying on Pfenning, that jump kicks are ordinary in karate generally and therefore he breached no duty as a matter of law absent intent or recklessness.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Dunn; the Court of Appeals reversed (divided), focusing on whether "ordinary" is judged by the specific drill or the sport in general.
- The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed summary judgment, holding that ordinary-sport conduct is measured by the sport generally and that no evidence supported intent or recklessness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “ordinary conduct” for Pfenning’s sports-injury rule is judged by the specific activity/drill or the sport generally | Megenity: ordinary conduct should be assessed relative to the specific drill; jump kicks were not done in that drill | Dunn: ordinary conduct is judged by the sport generally; jump kicks are ordinary in karate overall | Court: ordinary conduct is measured by the sport generally, not the specific activity (sport-wide standard) |
| Whether Dunn breached a duty by executing a jump kick during the drill | Megenity: the jump kick violated drill protocol and was extraordinary, creating a fact issue on breach | Dunn: jump kicks are part of karate and thus nonactionable ordinary conduct under Pfenning | Court: no breach as a matter of law because jump kicks are ordinary in karate generally |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to show intent to injure | Megenity: none — she conceded the injury was not intentional | Dunn: no intent; apologized and evidence shows accident | Court: no evidence of intentional infliction; intent not shown |
| Whether evidence supported reckless infliction of injury (conscious disregard) | Megenity: extreme impact, rule violation, and apology raise a fact issue of recklessness | Dunn: those facts do not show conscious disregard or conduct totally outside sport norms | Court: no evidence of conscious disregard or conduct totally outside the sport; recklessness not shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. 2011) (establishes that sports participants do not breach duty as a matter of law for conduct ordinary in the sport; liability remains for intentional or reckless acts)
- Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384 (Ind. 2016) (recites negligence elements for plaintiff’s burden)
- Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (defines intent for intentional infliction in sports context)
- Welch v. Young, 950 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (discusses requirement that intentional or reckless conduct be totally outside ordinary sport activity)