Tresa Megenity v. David Dunn
55 N.E.3d 367
Ind. Ct. App.2016Background
- Plaintiff Tresa Megenity (black belt) held a bag during a large "kicking-the-bag" drill at a karate studio; defendant David Dunn (green belt) was a less-experienced student performing kicks.
- Dunn was told to "hold back" but, according to Megenity, performed a jump kick (rather than a front kick) that struck the bag she held and caused her to fall and sustain an ACL and meniscal injury requiring surgery.
- Megenity sued Dunn for negligence and recklessness; Dunn moved for summary judgment relying on Pfenning v. Lineman, arguing his conduct was reasonable as a matter of law.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Dunn; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding a genuine issue of material fact.
- Majority: found whether jump kicks are outside ordinary behavior in a karate drill is not commonly understood and thus is a fact issue for the jury. Dissent: argues karate is generally a contact sport and Dunn’s conduct was within ordinary behavior, so summary judgment should be affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dunn’s conduct was within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport (so reasonable as a matter of law under Pfenning) | Dunn performed a jump kick directed at a person during a drill; jump kicks are not part of the kicking-the-bag drill and are unreasonable and outside ordinary behavior | Jump/jump-like kicks are within ordinary karate conduct and, under Pfenning, such participant conduct is reasonable as a matter of law | Reversed: court held that what is reasonable in a karate drill is not commonly understood as a matter of law and designated evidence raised a genuine factual dispute whether Dunn’s kick exceeded ordinary behavior |
Key Cases Cited
- Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. 2011) (holds that in sports cases conduct within the range of ordinary participant behavior is reasonable as a matter of law; liability may remain for intentional or reckless conduct)
- Welch v. Young, 950 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (applies Pfenning and denies summary judgment where factual disputes prevent as-a-matter-of-law determination of ordinary participant behavior)
- Haire v. Parker, 957 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (vacates summary judgment under Pfenning when the ordinary nature of the challenged conduct in the activity is not commonly understood as a matter of law)