Trent Lindig v. Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club
03-15-00051-CV
| Tex. App. | Oct 23, 2015Background
- Appellant Trent Lindig appealed the trial court’s denial of his Rule 248 motion challenging whether a 1927 deed’s reverter clause had been triggered.
- The 1927 deed stated property "shall revert" to grantor if the "School House or any other house which may be built and used for a School house is removed from said land."
- Evidence showed no school had operated on the property since the early 1950s; a 1952 deed described the land as "formerly used for school purposes but now no longer so used."
- The trial court found the 1927 deed unambiguous and declared no reversion had occurred; the appellate panel affirmed, stating the schoolhouse has not been removed and that the Club has current title.
- Lindig moved for rehearing arguing the panel misapplied deed-construction rules by ignoring that "School" modifies "House," and that a building cannot be a "school house" absent a school; he also asked the panel to clarify its opinion does not resolve appellee’s overall title.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lindig) | Defendant's Argument (Club) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1927 deed’s reverter was triggered | The clause ties reversion to use: without a school there is no "school house," so reverter occurred | The presence of a house/structure prevents reversion; the house has not been removed so no reversion | Panel held the reverter was not triggered (affirming trial court) |
| Whether courts must give effect to the modifier "School" in "School House" | "School" is essential; treating "house" alone rewrites the deed and renders words meaningless | Interprets clause as concerned with physical removal of a building rather than continued use | Panel rejected Lindig’s construction; concluded schoolhouse has not been removed |
| Whether precedent (e.g., Stewart) requires considering use in construing "school house" | Stewart holds a building is not a schoolhouse without an operating school; thus use controls | Relied on other authority and factual focus on physical removal/continuity of structure | Panel declined to follow Stewart on this point, citing other cases |
| Whether the opinion should be limited to the reverter issue (i.e., not decide title) | Appellant requests clarification that the opinion only decided the reverter question and does not adjudicate appellee’s title or resolve later deeds, standing, or adverse possession claims | Appellee treated the hearing as resolving its title as to the reverter; panel’s language suggested current title | Appellant asks for a substituted opinion clarifying the limited scope; panel’s opinion as written could be read to discuss title, but written order addressed only reverter |
Key Cases Cited
- Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (primary rule: interpret deed from all language; give effect to every clause)
- Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011) (en banc) (each word and phrase given plain meaning; avoid rendering provisions meaningless)
- Winegar v. Martin, 304 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010) (deed construction requires consideration of every pertinent word, clause, and part)
- Stewart v. Blain, 159 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1913) (building may exist but is not a schoolhouse absent an operating school)
- Pitts v. Camp County, 39 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1931) (court analyzed meaning of phrase within deed context when assessing reverter condition)
- Glen Rose Collegiate Institute v. Glen Rose Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 125 S.W. 379 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1910) (distinguished: reverter clause there had different, express conditions; court refused to imply perpetual maintenance requirement)