Trent Lindig v. Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club
03-15-00051-CV
| Tex. App. | May 5, 2015Background
- In 1927 Albert Lindig conveyed a parcel to Blanco County school trustees with a reverter clause: the land "shall revert" to Lindig or heirs "in case the said School House ... is removed from said land."
- The 1927 deed also contains precatory language referring to use for "school purposes," but the reverter clause mentions only removal of the schoolhouse (separate sentence introduced by "but").
- In 1952 the county trustees conveyed the property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association (later Pleasant Hill-Rocky Community Club, PHRCC) "for as long as the above described premises are used for Public and Community purposes," and the deed referenced the 1927 deed.
- PHRCC has continuously used the property for public/community purposes since 1952; the building remained on the land and the property hosted community events and a benefit dinner from 1958 onward.
- Appellant Trent Lindig claims the 1927 reverter was triggered (seeking to assert superior title); trial court held the possibility of reverter never occurred and ruled for PHRCC.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1927 deed's reverter was triggered | Lindig: property reverted because school use ceased or activities conflicted with original school-purpose condition | PHRCC: the deed's reverter applies only if the school building is removed; mere change of use or nonuse does not trigger reversion | Court held the reverter was not triggered because the clause requires removal of the schoolhouse |
| Proper construction of ambiguous limitation | Lindig: interpret the deed to effect reversion when school purposes cease | PHRCC: any ambiguity must be strictly construed against grantor to avoid forfeiture, favoring grantee's estate | Court applied strict-construction principle for forfeitures and favored grantee's interpretation |
| Relevance of precatory language ("school purposes") to reverter | Lindig: purpose language should be harmonized with reverter | PHRCC: precatory statements are separate from the reverter sentence introduced by "but" and are advisory only | Court treated the reverter clause as separate and controlling, not the precatory language |
| Precedent (Stewart v. Blain) applicability | Lindig: relies on broader precedent that equates failure of school use with reversion | PHRCC: argues Stewart misapplied by inferring intent beyond deed language; here language is materially different | Court declined to adopt an inference beyond the deed's clear language; held reverter requires removal of building |
Key Cases Cited
- Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262 (2004) (Trespass to try title is the statutory method to determine real-property title)
- Rogers v. Ricane Enters., 884 S.W.2d 763 (1994) (standards for title recovery in trespass-to-try-title actions)
- Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 792 S.W.2d 945 (1990) (ambiguities in restrictive covenants are construed to avoid forfeiture)
- Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (1991) (deed interpretation follows contract-construction rules; courts look to intent reflected in the instrument)
- Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (1984) (primary duty of courts is to ascertain intent from deed language)
- Stewart v. Blain, 159 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (contrasting case where court inferred reversion from use; criticized here for departing from four-corners interpretation)