Tremont Public Advisors, LLC v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 333 Conn. 672

Background:

Plaintiff Tremont Public Advisors (public affairs firm) submitted a compliant bid in response to a 2011 RFP for municipal liaison services issued by defendant Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA), a quasi‑public agency; the incumbent (Brown Rudnick) submitted a noncompliant bid but nonetheless received/kept the contract.
Tremont alleged the RFP was a sham: CRRA preselected Brown Rudnick, violated its procurement rules and § 22a‑268 (competitive bidding statute), and awarded the contract because Brown Rudnick performed prohibited lobbying (§ 1‑101bb).
Tremont claimed anticompetitive effects: fewer competitors, inflated liaison fees, degraded service quality, and higher costs passed to member municipalities; it sought damages under the Connecticut Antitrust Act (§ 35‑24 et seq.).
CRRA moved to dismiss (arguing lack of antitrust standing and other immunities) and to strike (arguing failure to plead anticompetitive conduct or harm to competition as a whole); the trial court denied dismissal but granted the motion to strike for failure to plead antitrust injury.
The Connecticut Supreme Court held Tremont failed to plead an antitrust injury (and thus lacked standing), concluded challenges to antitrust injury/efficient‑enforcer implicate subject‑matter jurisdiction and must be raised by motion to dismiss, and remanded with direction to dismiss (not strike). Cheryl Terry Enterprises was limited to the extent it suggested pleading antitrust injury is unnecessary.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sham bidding / awarding a public contract to a preselected bidder supports a claim under the Connecticut Antitrust Act	Sham competitive process and award in violation of § 22a‑268 (and illegal lobbying) produced anticompetitive effects and suffices	Violations of procurement laws and corrupt awards do not, standing alone, restrict competition in the antitrust sense	No; such allegations do not alone show the sort of competition‑reducing conduct that gives rise to antitrust injury
Whether failure to plead antitrust injury and efficient‑enforcer should be raised by motion to dismiss or motion to strike	Court can treat as a merits/pleading deficiency (motion to strike)	These are standing/antitrust‑standing issues implicating subject‑matter jurisdiction and require dismissal	These issues implicate standing/subject‑matter jurisdiction and should be raised in a motion to dismiss
Whether violation of a competitive‑bidding statute is a per se antitrust violation	A statutory procurement violation (sham bidding) is actionable under the antitrust act	Competitive‑bidding statutes serve different purposes and a statutory violation does not automatically equate to an antitrust restraint	No; violation of bidding laws alone does not equal an antitrust injury or a per se antitrust violation
Whether Cheryl Terry Enterprises remains controlling on standing to sue public entities under the antitrust act	Cheryl Terry supports that unsuccessful bidders have standing to sue public entities under Connecticut antitrust law	Cheryl Terry did not address the antitrust‑injury requirement; federal antitrust‑standing principles should apply	Cheryl Terry is limited/partially overruled: private parties may sue public entities, but must plead antitrust injury and be an efficient enforcer

Key Cases Cited

Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford, 270 Conn. 619 (Conn. 2004) (held a private party may sue a municipality under Connecticut Antitrust Act but did not decide antitrust‑injury requirement)
Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 303 Conn. 205 (Conn. 2011) (bribery/corruption in awarding contracts does not automatically create antitrust injury)
In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2016) (articulates two‑part antitrust‑standing/efficient‑enforcer test at pleading stage)
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (U.S. 1988) (distinguishes vertical from horizontal restraints; vertical agreements are not per se illegal)
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (U.S. 1993) (antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors; defines antitrust injury concept)
Federal Paper Board Co. v. Amata, 693 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Conn. 1988) (payment of bribes to a purchaser does not by itself establish an anticompetitive effect)
Doron Precision Sys., Inc. v. FAAC, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (distinguishes aims of public competitive‑bidding laws from antitrust laws; bidding violations do not necessarily restrict purchaser choice)
Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.) (illegal influence on public contracting that merely makes victory easier does not necessarily amount to an antitrust restraint)
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (U.S. 1965) (Noerr‑Pennington doctrine on immunity for petitioning government)