Trees v. Ordonez, 279 P.3d 337

Peggy Trees sued Dr. Ordonez and his professional corporation in a medical malpractice action after anterior cervical fusion.
Ordonez used a size 28 Cervical Spine Locking Plate with bone screws and locking screws; five of six screws protruded from the plate.
Postoperative complications included neck pain, an anterior abscess, esophageal contamination, and multiple subsequent surgeries culminating in a fused cervical spine and permanent disability.
Plaintiff alleged Ordonez breached the standard of care by improper plate/screw placement and failure to detect/repair esophageal perforation, among other claims.
Plaintiff offered biomechanical expert testimony (Tencer) stating the plate installation violated manufacturer instructions and biomechanical norms.
Trial court granted a directed verdict on negligence after deeming expert testimony insufficient; court allowed limited causation-related testimony but barred some causation evidence; appeal followed with affirmance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Tencer’s testimony sufficient to prove standard of care and breach?	Trees contends Tencer establishes a uniform standard for plate use and breach by Ordonez.	Ordonez argues Tencer isn’t qualified to state medical standard of care; testimony addresses biomechanics only.	No; expert medical testimony required and Tencer failed to prove the standard of care.
Can the case proceed without expert medical testimony on standard of care?	Trees argues common-knowledge suffices due to foreign-object-like screws.	Ordonez argues the issue is complex medical malpractice needing expert input.	No; expert medical testimony required to establish the standard of care here.
Does res ipsa loquitur apply to medical malpractice here?	Trees seeks to invoke res ipsa to infer negligence and causation.	Ordonez contends the injury is not within res ipsa’s typical scope and there’s no medical testimony of probable negligence.	No; res ipsa loquitur not applicable given lack of appropriate medical evidence and rarity of injury in this context.

Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414 (1992) (standard for reviewing directed verdicts; evidence viewed in plaintiff's favor)
Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174 (1971) (expert testimony ordinarily required to prove medical standard of care)
Dowell v. Mossberg, 226 Or 173 (1960) (professional negligence standard of care in physician actions)
Burton v. Rogue Valley Medical Center, 122 Or App 22 (1993) (expert familiarity with treatment methods required for standard of care)
Jeffries v. Murdock, 74 Or App 38 (1985) (expert testimony generally required; some cases permit lay judgment for simple negligence)
Fieux v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Clinic, P.C., 159 Or App 637 (1999) (res ipsa not applicable where medical testimony is required)
Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Or 196 (1965) (reservations on applying res ipsa in medical malpractice)
Nicholson v. Sisters of Charity, 255 Or 251 (1970) (foreign-object scenarios permitting some negligence inference without expert testimony)
Piehl v. The Dalles General Hospital, 280 Or 613 (1977) (foreign-object and discovery/retention contexts permitting jury conclusions without expert testimony)
Siverson v. Weber, 22 Cal Rptr 337 (1962) (cited in context of res ipsa considerations (note: non-OREGON case cited for principle))