905 F.3d 357
6th Cir.2018Background
- Upper Arlington adopted a Master Plan and Development Ordinance concentrating commercial office uses on limited land to maximize municipal revenue, including personal income tax from employees; both secular and religious schools are prohibited in the office district while places of worship require a conditional-use permit.
- Tree of Life (religious K–12 school) bought a 254,000 sq. ft. office building in the office district intending to consolidate campuses and operate a school; the city denied conditional-use/rezone requests.
- Tree of Life sued under RLUIPA (both substantial-burden and equal terms), First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and state-law claims; most claims were abandoned or dismissed, leaving only the RLUIPA equal terms claim on appeal.
- On remand after prior appeals, the core question was whether Tree of Life identified a nonreligious comparator (e.g., daycares, partially used offices) that the ordinance treats more favorably in a way that violates RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.
- The district court found daycares (the only viable comparator raised) generate materially more revenue per square foot than the proposed school and that partially used offices are not an appropriate comparator; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper legal test for RLUIPA equal-terms comparators | The statute requires only comparison to a nonreligious "assembly or institution"; no extra "similarly situated" gloss | Courts should compare religious and nonreligious uses with regard to the regulation's legitimate zoning criteria (e.g., revenue); plaintiff bears prima facie burden | Adopted majority test: comparators must be similarly situated with regard to legitimate zoning criteria; plaintiff bears initial burden to make prima facie case |
| Is revenue maximization a legitimate zoning purpose and is the City's stated purpose pretextual? | Revenue-maximization is not a permissible zoning basis (argued) or is pretextual given nonprofit exceptions | Revenue maximization is a legitimate zoning criterion; city Master Plan and data support the purpose; nonprofit exceptions do not defeat overall purpose | Revenue maximization is a legitimate zoning criterion and the City’s stated purpose is not shown to be pretextual |
| Are partially used offices valid comparators? | Partial-use comparisons show offices could be operated in ways that generate little revenue, so they are comparable | Regulators reasonably assess full, intended use when zoning; allowing partial-use comparators would nullify municipal regulatory goals | Partially used offices are not acceptable comparators for RLUIPA equal-terms analysis (compare full uses) |
| Are daycares valid comparators and did Tree of Life meet its prima facie burden? | Daycares (including nonprofit daycares) are similarly situated and permitted in office district; Tree of Life’s experts estimated comparable or lower revenue | City’s expert used per-square-foot revenue data showing daycares generate materially more revenue per sq. ft. than Tree of Life; Tree of Life presented no evidence other permitted uses would generate as little revenue | Daycares are the only potentially valid comparator but plaintiff failed to show daycares generate comparable (similarly low) revenue per square foot; no prima facie RLUIPA equal-terms violation found |
Key Cases Cited
- Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (articulates elements for RLUIPA equal-terms claim and comparator requirement for as-applied challenges)
- River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (frames comparator inquiry around "accepted zoning criteria," warns against subjective regulatory-purpose justifications)
- Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (examines facial discrimination and uses broad ‘‘assemblies or institutions’’ comparator class)
- Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007) (compares uses in light of regulatory purpose; rejects rigid "similarly situated in all respects" test)
- Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011) (adopts comparator test referencing legitimate zoning criteria and regulatory purpose)
- T. Marzetti Co. v. Roskam Baking Co., 680 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2012) (standard of review guidance for bench trial findings)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (rational-basis review principle for municipal classifications)
- Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 2004) (zoning amendment may moot equitable relief but not claims for monetary damages)
- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning as traditional local government authority)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (judicial role to interpret law)