Treasurer of the State v. Witte
2013 Mo. LEXIS 298
Mo.2013Background
- Four consolidated appeals against the Missouri Second Injury Fund (the fund) where the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarded fund benefits after claimants with preexisting permanent partial disabilities sustained later work injuries (Witte, Salviccio, Dyson, Buhlinger).
- Central statutory provision: § 287.220.1 (pre-2014 version) sets numerical thresholds to trigger fund liability: 50 weeks for body-as-a-whole preexisting disability or 15% PPD for a major extremity.
- Commission had combined multiple smaller preexisting disabilities (converted to weeks when necessary) to meet the statutory thresholds and then used all preexisting conditions to calculate the fund’s share of compensation.
- The fund argued the commission erred by "stacking" multiple preexisting disabilities to meet thresholds and by including below-threshold preexisting conditions when computing the fund’s payment.
- The Missouri Supreme Court held that section 287.220.1 requires a single preexisting permanent partial disability (considered individually) to meet the thresholds to trigger fund liability, but that all preexisting conditions must be considered when calculating the fund’s monetary liability once the threshold is met.
- Application to each claimant: Witte — no single preexisting disability met threshold (award reversed); Salviccio, Dyson, Buhlinger — each had at least one preexisting disability meeting the threshold, so awards affirmed (amounts properly calculated using all injuries).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether multiple preexisting PPDs can be combined to meet § 287.220.1 thresholds | Claimants: commission may convert and combine preexisting disabilities to reach threshold | Fund: statute requires each preexisting disability, individually, meet the threshold — no stacking | Held: statute requires a single preexisting PPD (singular "disability/injury") meet the threshold; stacking preexisting disabilities is impermissible |
| Whether disabilities from the last injury must meet numerical thresholds | Claimants: last-injury disabilities must be considered but need not individually meet thresholds | Fund: last-injury disabilities should meet thresholds too | Held: last-injury disabilities need not meet numerical thresholds; threshold applies to preexisting disability and to the combined disability, not each last-injury component |
| Whether all preexisting conditions (including below-threshold ones) may be used to compute fund’s monetary liability once threshold met | Claimants: once threshold met by a qualifying preexisting disability, ALJ must consider all preexisting conditions in computing fund liability | Fund: only preexisting disabilities that met thresholds should be used in calculation | Held: once liability is triggered by a qualifying preexisting PPD, the statute requires consideration of all injuries/conditions existing at time of last injury to calculate the fund’s share |
| Application to claimants here (sufficiency of individual preexisting disabilities) | Claimants: at least one preexisting disability met threshold in each case | Fund: some claimants lacked any single preexisting disability meeting threshold | Held: Witte — no single preexisting PPD met threshold (award reversed). Salviccio, Dyson, Buhlinger — each had an individual preexisting disability meeting threshold; awards affirmed and amounts properly computed using all injuries |
Key Cases Cited
- Pierson v. Treasurer of State, 126 S.W.3d 386 (Mo. banc 2004) (explains fund purpose and synergistic compensation concept)
- Motton v. Outsource Int'l, 77 S.W.3d 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (rejects converting major-extremity percentage thresholds into weeks)
- State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. banc 2009) (rules on statutory construction principles)
- Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594 (Mo. banc 2008) (standard: issues of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 333 S.W.3d 450 (Mo. banc 2011) (statutory ambiguity and construction guidance)
- Hornbeck v. Spectra Painting, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 624 (Mo. banc 2012) (deference to commission on factual findings)
- State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. banc 2010) (presumption that legislature’s differing word choices are intentional)