Treasure Coast Marina, LC, etc. v. the City of Fort Pierce, Florida, etc.
219 So. 3d 793
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Riverfront (private marina owner) sued the City of Fort Pierce, the St. Lucie County Property Appraiser, and the Florida Department of Revenue, challenging ad valorem tax exemptions granted to two municipally owned marinas for tax years 2011–2013.
- Trial court granted summary judgment to Riverfront, holding the city marinas were not used for a "municipal or public purpose" and thus not exempt.
- The Fourth District reversed, concluding Gainesville did not change the longstanding definition of "municipal or public purpose" and that municipally owned and operated marinas are traditionally exempt.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review of the certified question whether municipally owned and operated marinas remain "municipal or public purpose" exemptions in light of Florida Dept. of Revenue v. City of Gainesville.
- The Supreme Court held Gainesville did not narrow the test for the exemption; it distinguished services historically provided by municipalities from those traditionally provided by the private sector and concluded public marinas are traditional municipal functions entitled to a presumption of exemption.
- The Court remanded with instruction to enter summary judgment recognizing the city marinas as properly tax-exempt for the years at issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether municipally owned and operated marinas qualify as tax-exempt "municipal or public purposes" under Art. VII, § 3(a) | Riverfront: Gainesville introduced a narrower "essential" standard requiring indispensability and excludes functions competing with private sector; marinas therefore not exempt | City/Property Appraiser: Gainesville did not change the established definition; traditional municipal functions (including marinas) remain presumptively exempt when municipally owned and exclusively used | Held: Yes — Gainesville did not announce a new, narrower standard; municipally owned and operated marinas are traditional municipal functions entitled to a presumption of exemption |
| Whether Gainesville displaced prior precedent about traditional municipal functions | Riverfront: Gainesville signaled a new more restrictive test focusing on "essential" and private-sector competition | City: Gainesville was limited to telecommunication services (newly provided by municipalities) and did not disturb precedent for traditional functions | Held: Gainesville is limited; it distinguishes historically private services from traditional municipal services and does not overrule prior cases |
| Whether locks, leases to private users, or revenue generation defeat public-purpose status | Riverfront: Security locks and private leases/revenue indicate private character or nonexclusive public use | City: Locks used for security; marinas remain open to public (day docking) and exclusive-use requirement satisfied; portions leased to private operators are separately taxed | Held: Locks, revenue, or mixed users do not defeat exemption where property is municipally owned, used exclusively by municipality, and open to the public; leased portions may be separately assessed |
| Burden to rebut presumption of exemption | Riverfront: Argued it rebutted presumption by showing competition/private nature | City: Presumption attaches for traditional municipal functions; challenger must show no municipal/public purpose | Held: Riverfront failed to rebut presumption; marinas serve transportation, public access, and recreational municipal purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida Dept. of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2005) (clarified that exemption analysis distinguishes traditional municipal functions from services historically provided by private sector)
- State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 200 So. 100 (Fla. 1941) (historic construction of "municipal purposes" under the pre-1968 constitution)
- Saunders v. City of Jacksonville, 25 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1946) (upheld municipal utility exemption and discussed legislative role in policing abuses)
- Ford v. Orlando Utilities Comm’n, 629 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1994) (municipal electric generation held a municipal purpose)
- City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 374 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979) (presumption that vacant municipally owned land held for public purpose)
- Page v. City of Fernandina Beach, 714 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (dicta that a marina both owned and operated by a municipality would be exempt)
- Islamorada, Village of Islands v. Higgs, 882 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (held municipally owned and operated marina qualified for exemption)
- Zingale v. Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist., 960 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (recognized Gainesville did not alter test and affirmed exemption for recreational facilities)
- CAPFA Capital Corp. 2000A v. Donegan, 929 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (applied distinction between traditional municipal services and those typically provided by private sector)
- Greater Orlando Aviation Auth. v. Crotty, 775 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (confirmation of municipal-purpose concepts used in exemption analysis)