142 So. 3d 1189
Ala. Civ. App.2013Background
- Traywick, an incarcerated litigant, sued his former attorney Kidd for breach of contract/malpractice relating to representation in state criminal proceedings, and was granted in forma pauperis status.
- Clerk processed summons; Traywick moved for a default judgment after service and the trial court entered an order stating the application for default judgment was granted (no damages assessed).
- Kidd appeared about a week later, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (arguing noncompliance with the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA) pleading requirements) and a motion to set aside the default; the court set aside the default and dismissed the complaint the same day.
- Traywick moved to set aside the dismissal (construed as a Rule 59(e) motion); procedural delays and appellate transfers followed; appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals ensued.
- The appellate court affirmed the setting aside of the default but reversed the dismissal, holding the complaint met Rule 8(a) and ALSLA pleading requirements per Ex parte Free and Free v. Lasseter, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly set aside the default entry | Default granted; Traywick argued it should stand | Kidd argued entry should be set aside and timely moved to set it aside | Affirmed: court has broad discretion under Rule 55(c) to set aside an entry of default and did not abuse discretion |
| Whether the complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to plead ALSLA standards | Traywick argued complaint satisfied Rule 8(a) and ALSLA notice pleading requirements | Kidd argued complaint failed to state applicable standard of care or specific breaches as required by ALSLA | Reversed: complaint survives 12(b)(6) under Ex parte Free; plaintiff need not plead detailed breach of standard of care to survive dismissal |
| Whether the court properly converted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment and ruled without notice | Traywick argued he received no notice and no opportunity to oppose summary judgment | Kidd treated motion as dismissive or alternatively for summary judgment | Held: Court could not treat motion as summary judgment — plaintiff lacked notice and opportunity to present opposition, so dismissal cannot be affirmed on summary judgment grounds |
| Whether dismissal should be affirmed on other grounds (e.g., merit, res judicata via Rule 32 denial) | Traywick declined or argued claims are viable | Kidd referenced collateral criminal proceedings (Rule 32 denial) and other merits-based defenses | Not decided: appellate court limited review to the grounds asserted in the 12(b)(6) motion and expressed no opinion on other potential defenses or merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Family Dollar Stores of Alabama, Inc., 906 So.2d 892 (Ala. 2005) (Rule 55(c) allows court to set aside an entry of default before final judgment)
- Ex parte Free, 910 So.2d 753 (Ala. 2005) (under ALSLA, plaintiff need not plead breach of the applicable standard of care to survive a motion to dismiss)
- Free v. Lasseter, 31 So.3d 85 (Ala. 2009) (claims arising from legal services must be recast under ALSLA)
- McConico v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 41 So.3d 8 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (interlocutory default-like orders may be set aside before final judgment)
- Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So.2d 600 (Ala. 1988) (standard of review for setting aside defaults: abuse of discretion; courts prefer deciding cases on the merits)
- Cedar Bend Ass’n v. Owens, 628 So.2d 506 (Ala. 1993) (trial court has broad discretion to set aside default judgments)
- Phillips v. AmSouth Bank, 833 So.2d 29 (Ala. 2002) (conversion of a motion to summary judgment requires notice and opportunity to present opposing evidence)