Travis LeBlanc v. United States Privacy and Civil Liberties
25-5197
| D.C. Cir. | Jun 30, 2025Background
- The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) is a five‑member, Senate‑confirmed, bipartisan oversight board created to review Executive Branch counterterrorism actions and advise Congress and the President; members serve staggered six‑year terms and cannot be Executive Branch employees.
- Plaintiffs Travis LeBlanc and Edward Felten were Senate‑confirmed PCLOB members who received emails in January 2025 requesting resignation and were then terminated without stated cause, leaving a single Republican member and depriving the Board of a quorum.
- Plaintiffs sued, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (and alternatively mandamus), arguing the President cannot remove PCLOB members without cause under 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee and the Fifth Amendment; defendants argued the statute contains no removal restriction and relief such as reinstatement is unavailable.
- The district court considered statutory text, structure, legislative history, and relevant precedent on presidential removal power and independent agencies, and held the PCLOB’s statutory structure and function indicate Congress intended removal protection.
- The court concluded the restriction is constitutional under the Humphrey’s Executor line of cases, found the plaintiffs’ removals were unlawful, and granted summary judgment: declaratory judgment that the terminations were void and a permanent injunction (against all defendants except the President) restoring the plaintiffs as PCLOB members (and limiting removal to for‑cause).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2000ee’s text restricts the President’s power to remove PCLOB members | LeBlanc: statute’s term, bipartisan requirement, removal from EOP and deletion of "serve at pleasure" show Congress intended protection | Williams: statute lacks an explicit for‑cause clause; silence means no restriction | Court: plain text does not contain an explicit removal clause, so textual test fails |
| Whether PCLOB’s structure and function imply a removal restriction | LeBlanc: five‑member, Senate‑confirmed, staggered terms, bipartisan, oversight role to Congress make at‑will removal operationally incompatible | Williams: PCLOB is primarily advisory to Executive; advisory role supports at‑will removal; avoidance of constitutional question favors defendants | Court: structure/function mirror multimember independent boards; implied restriction exists |
| Whether implied removal restriction is constitutional | LeBlanc: Humphrey’s Executor permits for‑cause protection for multimember expert agencies | Williams: Seila/Collins limit removal restrictions; PCLOB exercises executive functions so restriction would violate separation of powers | Court: PCLOB fits Humphrey’s Executor exception; restriction is constitutional |
| Available remedies (declaratory judgment, injunction, mandamus, backpay) | LeBlanc: entitled to declaration, reinstatement (injunction or mandamus); backpay not pursued in amended complaint | Williams: courts lack equitable power to reinstate principal officers; mandamus inappropriate; backpay available so injunction unnecessary | Court: declaratory relief granted; permanent injunction (de facto reinstatement via enjoining subordinates) appropriate; mandamus would be available but unnecessary; backpay not required here |
Key Cases Cited
- Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93 (1988) (presumption that removal power accompanies appointment unless statute clearly indicates otherwise)
- Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding for‑cause removal protection for a multimember independent regulatory commission)
- Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197 (2020) (refusing to extend Humphrey’s Executor to a single‑director agency with substantial executive power)
- Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (recognizing broad presidential removal authority as default)
- Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (term‑of‑office language is a cap, not an entitlement; does not alone restrict removal)
- Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (courts may order de facto reinstatement by directing subordinate officials to treat a wrongly removed official as occupying office)
- Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (discussion of limits on congressional restrictions on removal and separation‑of‑powers principles)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial authority to enforce individual rights against unlawful removal and to issue writs such as mandamus)