Travis Lamb v. State, 01-14-00901-CR

Background

Appellant Travis Lamb was convicted for possession of cocaine in Penalty Group 1; the State relied on the aggregate weight of a crystalline mixture (including adulterants/dilutants) totaling 1.77 grams.
Appellant argued the quantity of cocaine itself was only a trace (immeasurable) amount and that counting the weight of non-narcotic adulterants/dilutants to reach the statutory threshold is circular and improper.
The trial evidence included laboratory detection of cocaine at very low concentrations and testimony about possible contamination and environmental residue.
The court of appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the Controlled Substances Act defines ‘‘controlled substance’’ to include adulterants/dilutants and that the State need only prove the aggregate weight of the mixture.
Appellant filed a motion for rehearing (or to publish), arguing the appellate opinion misapplied Seals and violated due process by failing to treat sufficiency-of-evidence and quality-of-evidence arguments as coextensive.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Lamb)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether aggregate weight of a mixture (including adulterants/dilutants) may be used to satisfy statutory weight thresholds when the controlled-substance component is trace	Aggregate weight cannot be used because ‘‘adulterant/dilutant’’ presupposes a non‑trace controlled substance; using aggregate weight is circular and permits conviction based on contaminant residue	Statute defines ‘‘controlled substance’’ to include adulterants/dilutants and the State need only prove aggregate weight of the mixture	Court upheld use of aggregate weight: mixture weight (1.77 g) sufficed to meet 1–4 g element, so evidence was sufficient
Whether Seals v. State limits treating a mixture’s aggregate weight as proof when the illicit component is trace	Seals treated the illicit component as trace and thus supports limiting convictions where only trace amounts are present	Seals did not preclude use of aggregate weight where methamphetamine/cocaine was present and mixed with other materials	Court distinguished Seals and did not adopt a rule that aggregate weight cannot be used when the illicit component is trace
Whether sufficiency-of-evidence claims based on due process/quality of evidence were preserved and should have been addressed	Appellant: sufficiency-of-evidence is a Due Process claim about the quality (not just quantity) of proof and was raised on appeal; court should have addressed it	State: appellant failed to raise due process framing in his primary brief; issues raised first in reply are forfeited	Court held Appellant’s due process framing was not properly presented in the primary brief and declined to address new due-process arguments raised in reply

Key Cases Cited

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (U.S. 1992) (circular statutory definitions are problematic)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (sufficiency review focuses on quality/adequacy of evidence, not mere quantity)
Seals v. State, 187 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (treated presence of controlled substance in a bodily/bloody mixture; dissent viewed amount as trace)
King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (when quantity cannot be measured, additional evidence required to show knowledge)
Melton v. State, 120 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (State may prove aggregate weight of a mixture to satisfy statutory weight thresholds)
Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (affirmative links doctrine for constructive possession)
Shults v. State, 575 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (definition of trace amount as immeasurable quantity)
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (U.S. 1976) (courts’ obligation to safeguard personal liberties)