TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
141 S. Ct. 2190
| SCOTUS | 2021Background
- TransUnion sold an OFAC Name Screen add‑on that flagged consumers as “potential match[es]” to names on the Treasury Department’s OFAC list by matching only first and last names, producing many false positives.
- Sergio Ramirez received a TransUnion credit report with an OFAC alert; a car dealer refused the sale after seeing the report; TransUnion later sent him a separate letter about the OFAC match and removed the alert after litigation began.
- Ramirez sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), asserting (1) failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure accuracy (§1681e(b)), (2) failure to disclose all file information on request (§1681g(a)(1)), and (3) failure to include the statutorily required summary of rights with a disclosure (§1681g(c)(2)).
- The certified class contained 8,185 members; the parties stipulated that only 1,853 class members (including Ramirez) had TransUnion‑disseminated reports with OFAC alerts during the seven‑month class period; 6,332 class members had only internal (non‑disseminated) OFAC alerts.
- A jury awarded statutory and punitive damages to each class member; the Ninth Circuit affirmed standing for the entire class; the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reviewed Article III standing for damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dissemination of a credit report bearing a misleading OFAC alert gives Article III standing for damages under the FCRA reasonable‑procedures claim | Dissemination injured reputation; analogous to defamation; therefore concrete harm exists | No concrete harm because alerts were labeled "potential match" (not literally false) and thus not sufficiently like traditional defamation | Held: Yes for the 1,853 whose reports were disseminated — reputational harm sufficiently close to defamation to be concrete injury |
| Whether the mere presence of misleading OFAC alerts in internal TransUnion files (no dissemination) confers Article III standing for damages | Existence of inaccurate records and material risk of future dissemination cause concrete injury | Mere retention without dissemination causes no concrete harm; risk of future harm alone (for damages) is insufficient | Held: No for the 6,332 without dissemination — internal inaccuracy alone and speculative risk do not supply standing for damages |
| Whether the dual‑mailing/formatting defects (omitted OFAC info in first disclosure; separate letter lacking summary of rights) create an informational injury supporting damages for class members | Formatting deprived consumers of statutorily protected information or created a risk of failure to correct reports before dissemination | Formatting errors produced no cognizable downstream harm; plaintiffs presented no evidence of confusion, reliance, or adverse effects | Held: No for all class members except Ramirez — only Ramirez proved concrete harm from the mailings |
| Whether exposure to a risk of future harm can establish Article III standing to recover damages | Risk of real harm can be concrete (Spokeo); plaintiffs faced material risk of dissemination and harm | Risk-of‑harm can support injunctive relief but does not, by itself, support retrospective damages absent a concrete injury or manifestation | Held: Risk alone insufficient to support damages standing; may support injunctive claims if risk is imminent and substantial |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (Article III requires a concrete injury even for statutory violations; courts should assess whether harm has a close common‑law analogue)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and likely redressable)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (risk of future harm can support standing for injunctive relief only if the risk is certainly impending or substantial)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (publication of defamatory statement that exposes a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule gives rise to injury)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation and reputational harms recognized as cognizable injuries)
- Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (withholding statutorily required information can be a cognizable informational injury)
- Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (denial of information required by statute can cause a judicially cognizable injury)
- Owner‑Operator Indep. Drivers Assn. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 879 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (retention of inaccurate information without dissemination traditionally does not create concrete injury)