434 F.Supp.3d 806
C.D. Cal.2020Background:
- Plaintiff Tramon Wilson‑Davis worked for SSP America at Los Angeles airports and filed a California putative class action alleging wage-and-hour and UCL violations (eight causes of action).
- Claims include: minimum wage, overtime, meal periods, rest breaks, business expense reimbursement, accurate wage statements, waiting‑time penalties on separation, and UCL violations on behalf of California non‑exempt employees.
- Defendants removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331/1441, invoking LMRA § 301 preemption because resolution allegedly requires interpreting the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and because of the § 514 exemption.
- Plaintiff moved to remand to state court; defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
- The district court applied the Ninth Circuit’s two‑step Burnside §301 preemption test and analyzed whether adjudication would require interpreting the CBA (as opposed to merely referencing it).
- Court held the CBA need not be interpreted to resolve the state‑law claims, found §301 preemption inapplicable, granted remand to state court, and denied defendants’ dismissal motion as moot.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LMRA §301 completely preempts the state‑law wage and UCL claims | Wilson‑Davis: claims vindicate nonnegotiable state rights independent of the CBA; §301 does not preempt | SSP: resolution of claims substantially depends on interpreting the CBA (and §514 defense), so §301 preempts | No. §301 does not preempt; case remanded for lack of federal‑question jurisdiction |
| Whether CBA must be interpreted to calculate the "regular rate" and overtime | Regular rate is a legal question; court can calculate using clear CBA schedules and pay records without interpreting CBA language | Multiple CBA provisions must be interpreted (rate increases, tips, relief pay, meetings, reporting time) to compute regular rate | No interpretation required; CBA provisions are straightforward and can be referenced; no preemption |
| Whether meal/rest break premium payments and compliance require interpreting the CBA | Premium pay and break entitlement are governed by state law and calculable without interpreting CBA; CBA expressly commits to comply with wage‑and‑hour laws | Court must interpret CBA to determine premium amounts and whether breaks were authorized | No. Premiums and break issues resolvable under state law; CBA expressly requires compliance with break laws; no preemption |
| Whether grievance/arbitration provisions in the CBA waive employees’ state‑law rights or require CBA‑based adjudication | Grievance/arbitration clauses apply only to disputes about interpretation/application/enforcement of the CBA and do not clearly waive judicial forum for statutory claims | CBA establishes mandatory grievance/arbitration that covers plaintiff’s claims, precluding state‑court adjudication | No clear and unmistakable waiver; procedures are limited to CBA disputes; no preemption |
Key Cases Cited
- Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (§301 has broad preemptive force over suits founded on CBA rights)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (well‑pleaded complaint rule and plaintiff as master of the claim; artful pleading doctrine)
- Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (two‑step test to determine §301 preemption)
- Allis‑Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (nonnegotiable state‑law rights are not preempted by §301)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (legal character of claim—independent of CBA—controls preemption analysis)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (complete preemption is an extraordinary, narrowly construed doctrine)
- Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (artful pleading cannot defeat federal jurisdiction when federal law completely preempts state law)
- Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (defensive reliance on a CBA alone does not create §301 preemption)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (a contractual remedy that overlaps state law does not automatically make the claim a federal one)
- Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (union‑negotiated waiver of judicial forum for statutory claims must be clear and unmistakable)