489 S.W.3d 636
Ark.2016Background
- On May 14, 2012, Officer Travis Trammell (Bella Vista PD) arrested Linda Wright after ACIC records indicated an outstanding warrant in Washington County; Wright disputed the warrant at the scene.
- The actual warrant available later named a different “Linda M. Wright” with different DOB, address, and driver’s license number; Trammell did not have or read the physical warrant at the scene and relied on ACIC and dispatch confirmation.
- Wright was held in custody and later transferred to Washington County, where she bonded out; she was ultimately cleared because the warrant applied to a different person.
- Wright sued Trammell in his personal capacity for false arrest/false imprisonment; Trammell moved for summary judgment based on immunity under A.C.A. § 21-9-301.
- The circuit court denied summary judgment on immunity; the Court of Appeals dismissed an earlier appeal for lack of final order; this Court granted interlocutory review on the immunity/statutory-interpretation issue.
- The Supreme Court majority held as a matter of law that Trammell did not commit intentional torts of false arrest/false imprisonment and reversed, granting summary judgment on immunity grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Trammell committed the intentional torts of false arrest/false imprisonment | Wright: arrest and detention without a valid warrant; alleged wrongful arrest of wrong person supports intentional-tort claim | Trammell: relied on ACIC and dispatch confirmation; no intent to unlawfully arrest; no possession of warrant; facts undisputed | Court: as a matter of law, Trammell did not commit intentional false arrest/false imprisonment (no evidence of intent) |
| Whether A.C.A. § 21-9-301 immunizes Trammell from tort liability for negligence | Wright: claims are intentional torts, not negligence; immunity for negligence inapplicable | Trammell: to extent conduct was negligent, § 21-9-301 provides immunity; he also argued immunity should cover all torts (including intentional) | Court: resolved case on lack of intentional tort; did not decide whether § 21-9-301 covers intentional torts; recognized § 21-9-301 grants immunity for negligent acts but not intentional acts under existing precedent |
| Proper standard for immunity on facts of mistaken identity/warrant reliance | Wright: officer had no authority to arrest because warrant did not identify her; reliance on ACIC insufficient | Trammell: acting in good faith, followed protocol, sought dispatch confirmation; conduct was reasonable reliance entitled to immunity for negligent conduct | Court: factual record viewed as undisputed; held no intentional tort, implying officer’s conduct did not establish intentional misconduct; concurrence urged consideration of officer’s good-faith/reasonableness as basis for immunity |
| Reviewability of denial of summary judgment based on immunity | Wright: denial was correct; appellate review limited | Trammell: interlocutory appeal proper because denial of immunity defeats right to be free from suit; Court has jurisdiction | Court: exercised interlocutory jurisdiction and reviewed immunity de novo, reversed circuit court and remanded for entry consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Fayetteville v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318 (reviewability of denial of immunity; de novo review)
- Ark. River Educ. Servs. v. Modacure, 371 Ark. 466 (general rule on nonappealability of summary-judgment denials; immunity exception)
- Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126 (treating immunity as question of law; precedent on employee immunity)
- Headrick v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 Ark. 433 (equating false arrest and false imprisonment)
- Grandjean v. Grandjean, 315 Ark. 620 (definition of false imprisonment)
- Battle v. Harris, 298 Ark. 241 (intentional acts not covered by § 21-9-301 under prior cases)
- Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401 (scope of immunity for public employees)
- Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., 373 Ark. 472 (pleadings determine entitlement to immunity; standards for ruling on immunity at pleading stage)
