248 So. 3d 282
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2018Background
- Trafalgar Woods was approved by Cape Coral via Ordinance 88-92 (1992). The ordinance's § III(G)(5) states the developer "shall receive a credit" for on-site irrigation installation to reduce special assessments when city irrigation becomes available and that the credit "shall be applied against any special assessment to be levied against individual lots."
- § IV(B) of the ordinance provides the Development Order is binding on the developer and its heirs, assignees, or successors in interest, but says portions that "clearly apply only to the project developer" shall not bind future lot owners.
- The developer installed on-site irrigation and later conveyed control of the community to the homeowners association in the mid-1990s; city irrigation service later became available.
- In 2016 the Trafalgar Woods Homeowners Association sued Cape Coral for declaratory relief, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract, disputing valuation/availability of credits against special assessments for irrigation water.
- Cape Coral moved to dismiss, arguing the ordinance awards the irrigation credit only to the developer and § IV(B) excludes any developer-only rights from binding later lot owners; the trial court dismissed with prejudice.
- The Second District reversed, finding the trial court misconstrued the ordinance by reading § III(G)(5) in isolation rather than in context, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the irrigation-credit in § III(G)(5) inures only to the developer or also to lot owners/successors | The credit applies to special assessments on individual lots and therefore benefits lot owners/successors (homeowners association) | The first sentence of § III(G)(5) awards the credit to the developer only, and § IV(B) means developer-only provisions do not bind future owners | The credit cannot be read in isolation as developer-only; read in context it applies to individual lots and does not clearly limit the credit to the developer—dismissal was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruiz v. Brink's Home Sec., Inc., 777 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (standard of de novo review for dismissal)
- Green v. Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 2016) (pleading-stage standards; accept plaintiff's allegations and reasonable inferences)
- Weitzel v. State, 306 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (statutory/ordinance language may not be construed in isolation)
- Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Florida Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2008) (entire statute must be read as a whole; give meaning to all parts)
- Angelo's Aggregate Materials, Ltd. v. Pasco County, 118 So. 3d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (ordinances are subject to statutory construction rules)