Tracy Cain v. Kevin Chappell
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17799
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Tracy Cain was convicted of the 1986 first‑degree murders of William and Modena Galloway and sentenced to death; the prosecution alleged multiple special circumstances including rape (and attempted rape), robbery, and burglary.
- The original criminal complaint expressly alleged the murder of Mrs. Galloway occurred "while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of rape," but the second amended information alleged only that the murder occurred "while the defendant was engaged in the commission of rape" (omitting the explicit word "attempted").
- Trial evidence included violent blunt‑force injuries to both victims, physical and forensic evidence consistent with sexual assault of Mrs. Galloway (including microscopically similar pubic hairs and expert opinion supporting forced penetration), and Cain’s taped statements placing him at the scene and admitting theft.
- Cain’s trial counsel acknowledged on the record that he was not surprised by the prosecution’s argument and jury instructions treating the special circumstance as including attempted rape; counsel also conceded Cain’s participation in the burglary/robbery but argued he lacked intent to kill.
- The jury convicted Cain of first‑degree murder, found the special circumstances (including rape/attempted rape) true, and imposed two death sentences. The California Supreme Court affirmed; Cain sought federal habeas relief and the district court denied the petition but granted a COA on notice of the attempted‑rape special circumstance.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding the state court reasonably concluded Cain received constitutionally adequate notice and rejecting his related ineffective‑assistance and other habeas claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of notice of attempted‑rape special circumstance | Cain: amended information failed to charge attempted rape expressly, so he lacked constitutional notice of that theory | State: information cited the rape special‑circumstance statute (which expressly includes attempted rape); counsel admitted no surprise or prejudice | Held: No unreasonable state‑court decision; statute reference + counsel’s acknowledgement provided adequate notice; affirm. |
| Prosecutorial reliance on attempted‑rape theory | Cain: prosecutor improperly argued and relied on an uncharged attempted‑rape theory | State: theory was encompassed by the charged statute and supported by evidence; no prejudice | Held: Rejected—prosecutor’s argument was consistent with the information/statute and not a basis for habeas relief. |
| Ineffective assistance — guilt phase (conceding burglary / failing to object to attempted‑rape notice) | Cain: counsel unreasonably conceded burglary and failed to object to attempted‑rape theory, prejudicing defense | State: counsel’s concessions were strategic given Cain’s admissions and strong evidence; frankness with the court not deficient | Held: No Strickland violation; tactical choices reasonable under the record and not prejudicial. |
| Penalty‑phase ineffective assistance / mitigation investigation | Cain: counsel failed to investigate or present mitigating evidence (substance abuse, neuro/psych deficits, family history) | State: counsel obtained psychological evaluation, reasonably relied on it; additional mitigation risked rebuttal and aggravation; state court reasonably denied claim | Held: No prejudice shown under Strickland/AEDPA; state decision not unreasonable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (due‑process requires notice of the specific charge)
- Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (insufficient notice where information omitted a materially different sentencing statute and trial materials confused statutes)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standards for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (limits on counsel’s duties where no bona fide defense exists)
- Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (Eighth Amendment bar on executing persons with intellectual disability; IQ and adaptive‑functioning guidance)
- Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) (standards for AEDPA review of factual determinations)
- Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1 (2014) (limits on reliance for habeas relief where defendant received notice of potential alternate theory)
- Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006) (upholding capital sentence where some invalid aggravating findings did not undermine overall verdict)