Tracie F. v. Francisco D.
188 So. 3d 231
| La. | 2016Background
- Child D. born 2006; mother Tracie and father Francisco were unmarried. Maternal grandparents Kathy and Michael substantially raised D. from infancy.
- 2013: amid concerns about Tracie’s fitness, Kathy and Francisco stipulated to a joint custody judgment naming Kathy domiciliary parent; Francisco relinquished child support obligations.
- Francisco had minimal involvement for ~7 years but became substantially more involved beginning in 2013–2014 and sought to modify the stipulated judgment to be domiciliary parent / sole custodian.
- District court awarded sole custody to Francisco; the appellate court reversed, holding Francisco bore a heightened burden (rehabilitation + proof that Kathy’s environment materially changed) and reinstated the stipulated judgment.
- Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to decide the proper standard for modifying a stipulated custody award when a biological parent with joint custody seeks increased custodial rights.
Issues
| Issue | Francisco’s Argument | Kathy’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for modifying a stipulated custody judgment | Evans standard: party seeking modification must prove material change and that modification is in child’s best interest | Appellate majority: parent who consented must prove rehabilitation and that non-parent’s environment materially changed (adopting Jones) | Evans standard governs: prove (1) material change since original decree and (2) modification is in child’s best interest |
| Who bears burden when biological parent with joint custody seeks domiciliary status | Francisco: he must prove material change and best interest | Kathy: argued that Francisco should have heavier burden or that she must show substantial harm (per some circuits) | Burden remains on the party seeking modification (Francisco); domiciliary non-parent does not carry initial burden to prove harm |
| Whether Francisco showed a material change in circumstances | Francisco: his recent transformation from absentee to actively involved parent constitutes a material change | Kathy: contended her stable, long-standing custodial environment remained unchanged; increased contact should not be treated as material change | Court found Francisco proved material change based on his substantial new involvement in the child’s life |
| Whether awarding domiciliary status to Francisco would be in the child’s best interest | Francisco: argued the child preferred more time with him and that he can provide a loving, stable home | Kathy: emphasized continuity, long-term caregiving, schooling, and financial and educational support she provided | Court held Francisco failed the best-interest inquiry; continuity/stability with Kathy outweighed advantages of modifying custody |
Key Cases Cited
- Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La. 1986) (sets heightened Bergeron standard for modifying considered custody decrees)
- Evans v. Lungrin, 708 So.2d 731 (La. 1998) (party seeking modification of a stipulated custody judgment must show material change and that modification is in child’s best interest)
- In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545 (La. 1990) (explains constitutional parental rights and due process considerations)
- A.E.B. v. J.B.E., 752 So.2d 756 (La. 1999) (applies Bergeron distinction between considered decrees and stipulated judgments)
- Mulkey v. Mulkey, 118 So.3d 357 (La. 2013) (reaffirms best-interest standard under La. C.C. art. 131 in custody modifications)