Tracey Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississip, 743 F.3d 59

Johnson and James, police officers for the City of Shelby County, Mississippi, were terminated in September 2009 by the City’s board of aldermen.
They alleged the terminations were retaliation for refusing to overlook the criminal activities of alderman Harold Billings, and brought due process and state-law interference claims.
The district court granted summary judgment for the City and Billings and denied their Rule 59(e) motion to amend to plead § 1983.
Johnson and James appealed the grant of summary judgment and the denial of their 59(e) motion.
The district court applied state-law MTCA notice requirements to the malicious interference claim and treated the § 1983 issue as not properly pleaded.
The court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment and state-law questions, and abuse of discretion for leave to amend.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by denying § 1983 path for due process	Johnson and James argue they should be allowed to pursue § 1983 claims.	City contends a § 1983 vehicle is the proper path for constitutional claims and was correctly applied to dismiss.	District court did not err; § 1983 is proper vehicle for these claims.
Whether the denial of Rule 59(e) amendment to plead § 1983 was an abuse of discretion	Johnson and James should be allowed to amend to invoke § 1983.	Court may refuse after summary judgment; liberal amendment not required.	No abuse; amendment denied.
Whether MTCA notice requirements barred the malicious interference with contract claim	MTCA notice does not apply to acts by a public official outside employment scope.	MTCA notice applies to actions by employees acting within the scope of employment.	MTCA applies and claim is barred for lack of notice.
Whether Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss. controls MTCA scope for malicious interference claims	Whiting allows claims against state entities despite malice arguments.	Whiting supports MTCA applicability; conflict with Zumwalt resolved by latest authority.	Whiting controls; MTCA applies to malicious interference claims.

Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270 (5th Cir. 1994) (proper vehicle for constitutional claims is § 1983)
Hearth Admins., Corp v. City of New York, 394 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2012) (pleading theory limitations for § 1983 claims)
Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002) (liberal amendment standards are not unlimited; end to litigation)
Freeman v. Cont’l Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967) (no abuse in denying late amendments after summary judgment)
Union Planters Nat’l Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1982) (district court not abusing discretion in denying amendment)
S. Constructors Grp., Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1993) (standards for amendment after summary judgment)
Performance Autoplex II Ltd. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 322 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 2003) (de novo standard for summary judgment review)
Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981) (abuse-of-discretion review for leave to amend)
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. AFS/IBEX Fin. Servs., Inc., 612 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of state-law questions)
Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1997) (apply latest state-law authority)
Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 62 So. 3d 907 (Miss. 2011) (MTCA covers tortious breaches of contract; applicable to public employees)
Zumwalt v. Jones County Bd. of Supervisors, 19 So.3d 672 (Miss. 2009) (MTCA not applicable to all malice claims; context matters)