138 So. 3d 553
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Appellant was shopping at a Publix store when an employee, Almonzo Blanton, moved his unattended cart, began re-shelving items, and an altercation followed.
- The physical confrontation culminated in Blanton shoving Appellant, who fell; each party claimed the other was the aggressor.
- Appellant sued Publix for vicarious liability for battery committed by Blanton.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Publix, concluding Blanton acted outside the scope of employment.
- On appeal, Publix bore the burden to conclusively negate that Blanton acted within the real or apparent scope of employment.
- Blanton admitted the encounter was motivated by serving his employer, though Publix argued the shove was personal self-defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Blanton’s shove was within the real or apparent scope of employment | The shove arose from a business-related dispute (employee moved cart while doing store work); thus Blanton acted at least in part to serve Publix | The shove was personal self-defense and therefore outside the scope of employment | Reversed: fact issues exist whether Blanton’s purpose was to serve Publix; summary judgment improper |
| Whether employer’s prohibition of fighting overrides apparent scope of employment | Appellant: employer’s rules do not negate apparent scope when conduct appears to serve employer interests | Publix: Blanton’s testimony that fighting wasn’t authorized proves he acted outside scope | Rejected: whether act appears within scope is for jury; employer’s forbidding conduct is immaterial to apparent scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Weiss v. Jacobson, 62 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1953) (employer liable for employee’s acts within real or apparent scope of employment)
- Hennagan v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 467 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (scope test: time/space limits and purpose to serve master)
- City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1965) (act outside scope only when employee steps aside to accomplish personal purpose)
- Stinson v. Prevatt, 94 So. 656 (Fla. 1922) (apparent scope may exist even where employer forbids act)
- Valeo v. E. Coast Furniture Co., 95 So.3d 921 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (employee’s violent defense of perceived theft is a jury question on scope)
- Rivas v. Nationwide Pers. Sec. Corp., 559 So.2d 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (assault arising from job dispute supports jury determination on scope)