Toye v. State
2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 535
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Ashley Toye (17 at time of offenses) was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder and related charges; trial court imposed mandatory life without parole under §775.082(1).
- Toye’s convictions and sentences were affirmed in 2008; she filed a postconviction motion after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (2012).
- Toye argued Miller made her mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile homicide illegal and requested relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) / 3.850.
- The postconviction court denied the motion as untimely and relied on district-court precedent holding Miller is not retroactive (Geter; Gonzalez).
- The Second District reversed: it held Miller applies retroactively under Florida’s Witt analysis and remanded for resentencing consistent with Miller, certifying conflict with Geter and Gonzalez.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively in Florida | Miller establishes a new Eighth Amendment rule that juveniles cannot be mandatorily sentenced to LWOP; it should apply retroactively to Toye | Miller is procedural/evolutionary and should not overcome rule 3.850’s timeliness bar; prior district opinions hold Miller not retroactive | Miller applies retroactively under Florida’s Witt/Stovall‑Linkletter framework; summary denial reversed and case remanded for resentencing |
| Whether Miller constitutes a development of "fundamental significance" under Witt | Miller removes state authority to impose mandatory LWOP on juvenile homicide offenders and creates a substantive right to individualized consideration | Retroactivity would destabilize many final sentences and impose heavy burdens on courts | Court finds Miller is of fundamental significance (both categories): it removes nondiscretionary state power and meets Stovall‑Linkletter factors |
| Practical remedy on remand (scope of resentencing / sentencing range) | Resentencing courts should consider juvenile’s youth and attendant circumstances; retroactive relief requires resentencing under Miller | State urged deference to existing statutes and finality; district courts differ on appropriate sentencing ranges post‑Miller | Court remanded for resentencing but declined to specify sentencing range; certified conflict with other districts for Florida Supreme Court resolution |
| Whether statutory revival or other fix should be applied by appellate court | (advanced in concurrence) Revive prior (1993) statute permitting parole after 25 years to fill gap created by Miller | Majority: parties should litigate sentencing options at resentencing; appellate court should not supply unargued sentencing range | Majority declined to apply statutory revival; concurrence advocated revival but did not carry the opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (held mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders violates Eighth Amendment)
- Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1980) (Florida three-prong retroactivity test for new constitutional rules)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (barred LWOP for juveniles in nonhomicide cases; youth matters for sentencing)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barred death penalty for juvenile offenders; recognized juveniles’ distinct status)
- Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (retroactivity factors adopted in Linkletter framework)
- Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (retroactivity framework)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (distinct Sixth Amendment retroactivity analysis discussed and distinguished)