Towns v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.
1:23-cv-16316
N.D. Ill.Oct 28, 2024Background
- A group of African American plaintiffs (current and former employees of Peoples Gas, a utility in Chicago owned by WEC Energy Group) filed a proposed class action alleging systemic race and disability discrimination, retaliation, and related state law violations.
- Plaintiffs claim Peoples Gas intentionally created a hostile work environment and engaged in practices with a disparate impact on African American employees, including assignment to dangerous locations, overtime distribution, promotions, and discipline.
- Plaintiffs cite specific examples: disproportionately dangerous job assignments resulting in assaults (21 of 22 gunpoint assaults targeted African Americans), unequal discipline, and unfair overtime/promotion practices.
- Defendants filed motions to dismiss several counts of the complaint, including discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, the ADA, the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), IIED, and all claims against WEC.
- The court considered whether the complaint sufficiently alleged disparate treatment/disparate impact, intent, causation, and whether some claims were time-barred or preempted by the IHRA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disparate treatment claims (Counts I, II, VII) | Assignments, discipline, overtime, and promotions were race-based | Insufficient facts: no intent or causation; claims conclusory | Sufficiently pleaded; motion to dismiss denied |
| Disparate impact claims (Counts I, II, VII) | Practices facially neutral but harm African Americans disproportionately | No statistical or factual support for impact; insufficient pleading | Allegations sufficient at this stage; may proceed |
| Timeliness of claims under § 1981 | Discriminatory acts are ongoing, so within statute of limitations | Some plaintiffs were assigned more than four years before suit; claims time-barred | Not enough facts to dismiss as time-barred at this stage |
| Woods’s IHRA exhaustion | Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; don’t need to plead exhaustion | IHRA jurisdictional; Woods did not allege administrative exhaustion | Dismissed Woods's IHRA claim; may refile if cured |
| IIED preemption under IHRA (Count X) | Claims actionable independently of discrimination | Claims preempted because core legal duty is under IHRA | Dismissed IIED claim as IHRA-preempted |
| WEC liability | WEC oversaw Peoples Gas, controlled policies, had own hotline | No specific, plausible allegations linking WEC to discrimination | Dismissed all claims against WEC; no plausible allegations |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard for plausibility)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility and specificity for Rule 12(b)(6) motions)
- Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (but-for causation standard for § 1981)
- Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644 (explaining but-for causation)
- Zaderaka v. Illinois Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172 (Title VII analytical framework applies to IHRA)
- Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (definition of disparate impact claims)
- Garcia v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630 (IHRA’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional)
- Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (pleading requirements for discrimination claims)