Town of Griswold v. Camputaro, 331 Conn. 701

Background

Town of Griswold issued a 1994 cease‑and‑desist ordering Camputaro/American Sand & Gravel to stop operating an asphalt plant; administrative appeal and a simultaneous zoning enforcement action were consolidated in Superior Court.
Parties entered a stipulated judgment in 1997 restricting plant operations (including a 50 extra‑hours/year limit). Camputaro later died; his son Pasquale Jr. was substituted as defendant.
In 2015 the parties filed a joint motion to open and modify the 1997 judgment (increasing extra operating hours to 128/year); the clerk originally posted a short calendar hearing for Nov. 23, 2015.
By caseflow request (with the town’s consent) the hearing was moved up and the court held it on Nov. 16, 2015, granted the parties’ joint motion, and modified the judgment; the public was not notified of the new date.
Two nearby landowners (Londé and Ryan) filed motions to intervene under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a‑19 after the Nov. 23 date; the trial court denied the motions as untimely because the case had been resolved on Nov. 16.
The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the expedited hearing deprived the public of timely notice and the statutory right to intervene and participate in the stipulated settlement process; the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court (with a clarification on Practice Book § 11‑15).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether proposed intervenors were entitled to intervene under § 22a‑19 after the judgment was modified	The town argued the case was resolved on Nov. 16 so no pending proceeding existed to intervene in	Londé/Ryan argued the public notice was for Nov. 23 and the Nov. 16 rescheduling denied them their statutory right to intervene	Court held intervenors were entitled to intervene because they were deprived of timely, accurate notice of the hearing and thus of their statutory right
Whether rescheduling the short calendar hearing violated Practice Book § 11‑15 (five‑day filing rule)	Town and parties contended the court acted within its case management discretion	Intervenors argued moving the hearing less than five days after filing violated the rule and prejudiced nonparties	Court clarified § 11‑15 is a default rule subject to judicial discretion, but that discretion is limited where statutes (§ 8‑8(n), § 22a‑19) require timely notice to potential intervenors; affirmed reversal on statutory‑notice grounds
Whether statutory hearing/notice requirements under § 8‑8(n) and § 22a‑19 were satisfied	Town argued consent and expedited scheduling were permissible and adequate	Intervenors argued those statutes require timely, accurate public notice of hearings on settlements of administrative appeals	Held statutes demanded timely, accurate notice; the Nov. 16 expedited proceeding without proper notice was insufficient and undermined intervenors’ rights
Whether the trial court’s case management power allowed the near‑instantaneous opening and closing of the action	Town relied on broad case management discretion to justify scheduling	Intervenors said such “instant” disposition deprived public process and intervention rights	Court held trial courts have broad scheduling discretion but it cannot displace statutory notice and intervention rights in this context

Key Cases Cited

Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813 (recognizes broad case management authority of trial courts)
Peatie v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 112 Conn. App. 8 (trial court’s broad discretion in docket and courtroom management)
Byars v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 101 Conn. App. 44 (explaining purpose of five‑day short calendar rule and requirement of fair notice)
Udolf v. West Hartford Spirit Shop, Inc., 20 Conn. App. 733 (predecessor rule permits discretionary expedited hearings)
Brenmor Properties, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 326 Conn. 55 (adopted Appellate Court reasoning where appropriate)
Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 317 Conn. 46 (adopted Appellate Court reasoning where appropriate)