Towery v. Schriro
641 F.3d 300
| 9th Cir. | 2010Background
- Towery was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses and sentenced to death.
- A key prosecution witness, Barker, testified against Towery after a plea deal in a separate case, providing substantial corroboration.
- Meacham testified about Towery overhearing a statement, but this same overheard remark had been used in a prior unrelated robbery case with the same prosecutor.
- In the murder trial, the prosecutor argued Meacham’s testimony supported the murder theory; in the robbery case, it supported a robbery theory, creating allegedly inconsistent uses.
- Arizona courts held the prosecutor’s conduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that any error did not affect the verdict; federal habeas review followed AEDPA standards.
- The district court denied most claims but granted a COA on prosecutorial misconduct and certain other claims; the Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of relief and expanded COAs on two non-certified issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prosecutorial misconduct as harmless error | Towery argues misconduct could be harmful under due process. | Arizona courts found any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | Harmless error under AEDPA; no relief. |
| Napue violation | Prosecutor knowingly used or allowed false or misleading evidence. | No knowingly false testimony; no improper use. | Napue claim fails on the second prong (no knowledge of false impression). |
| Brady violation | Prosecutor failed to disclose Meacham’s prior testimony and its use. | Disclosure adequate; impeachment possible. | No prejudice; Brady claim fails. |
| General prosecutorial misconduct | Misconduct infected the trial with unfairness. | Harmless under standard; not a due process violation. | Not a due process violation under Darden/Donnelly standard. |
| Judicial bias at the murder trial | Judge Hendrix biased due to prior armed robbery trial. | State court decisions exhausted; default applies. | Procedural default bars relief; COA granted but petition denied on merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (Supreme Court 1959) (knowing use of false evidence violates due process; materiality required)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court 1963) (duty to disclose favorable evidence impeachment context)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (Supreme Court 1967) (harmless error standard in constitutional violations)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (Supreme Court 1986) (test for due process when prosecutorial misconduct infects trial with unfairness)
- Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (Supreme Court 1974) (reaffirmed standard for prosecutorial misconduct impact on fairness)
- Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court 2004) (prejudice and materiality in Brady claims)
- Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004) (cumulative impeachment evidence and lack of prejudice)
- Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (Supreme Court 2002) (deference to state-court factual findings in harmless error)
- Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2008) (framework for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct claims in habeas)