Tourgeman v. Collins Financial Services, Inc.
197 F. Supp. 3d 1205
S.D. Cal.2016Background
- Plaintiff Tourgeman sued under the FDCPA alleging (1) a collection letter misidentified his original creditor and falsely implied meaningful attorney involvement, and (2) a state-court complaint filed and served to him contained the same misidentification.
- Tourgeman sought only statutory damages and conceded no pecuniary loss or emotional distress.
- The Ninth Circuit previously found Nelson & Kennard violated the FDCPA and held Tourgeman had standing, but did not analyze whether the alleged injury was "concrete" under Article III.
- After the Supreme Court's decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins clarified that a statutory violation alone may not satisfy the concreteness requirement, the district court reconsidered standing.
- The Nelson & Kennard letter was mailed but Tourgeman did not receive it until months later during litigation; he suffered no actual harm from that letter.
- The state-court complaint was delivered (via his father) to Tourgeman in Mexico, he retained counsel, and the complaint was later dismissed; the court found tangible risks of litigation-related harm from that document.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for claims based on the mailed Nelson & Kennard letter | Statutory violation of the FDCPA alone confers Article III standing; inaccurate letter creates a material risk of harm | No actual injury because Tourgeman never received or saw the letter until litigation | Dismissed: lack of Article III standing; hypothetical risk from an unseen letter is too conjectural |
| Standing for claims based on the state-court complaint | The complaint’s inaccuracies caused real litigation risks (strategy, settlement, default) and thus concrete injury | Argue lack of concrete harm beyond statutory violation | Held: Article III standing exists for the claim based on the complaint |
| Effect of Spokeo on prior Ninth Circuit ruling | Spokeo does not eliminate statutory rights but requires concrete, de facto injury beyond a bare procedural violation | Spokeo supports requiring concrete injury, not automatic standing from statutory violation | Court applied Spokeo to require actual or imminent concrete harm; prior Ninth Circuit analysis was incomplete |
| Scope of trial after standing re-evaluation | Plaintiff seeks to proceed on all FDCPA claims | Defendant seeks dismissal of claims lacking standing to narrow trial | Court limited trial to the claim based on the state-court complaint; letter claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (Article III injury-in-fact requires concrete and particularized harm; statutory violation alone may not suffice)
- Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) (Ninth Circuit previously found FDCPA violation and held plaintiff had standing without analyzing concreteness)