414 F.Supp.3d 1143
N.D. Ill.2019Background
- Torzewski, a Director of Sales working remotely from Chicago, took FMLA leave in May 2017 for alcohol dependence and received short-term disability and in‑patient treatment.
- After treatment, he submitted a doctor’s release and sought to return to work; HR (Marcano) initially did not respond, then required an unrestricted release and later informed him his position had been relocated to Secaucus, New Jersey.
- Marcano told Torzewski he must relocate (with no relocation assistance) or resign; no other sales directors were relocated and the relocation was communicated only after Torzewski sought reinstatement.
- Torzewski refused to relocate because of his medical treatment and support network in Chicago; COSCO terminated his employment effective August 14, 2017 (retroactively communicated in mid‑September).
- Torzewski sued under the ADA, FMLA, and Illinois Human Rights Act alleging failure to accommodate, discrimination, failure to reinstate, and retaliation; COSCO moved to dismiss.
- The district court denied dismissal of ADA failure‑to‑accommodate, ADA discrimination, FMLA interference, FMLA retaliation, and IHRA claims tied to the ADA claims, but dismissed ADA and IHRA retaliation claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADA failure to accommodate — was plaintiff "otherwise qualified" and requested reasonable accommodation? | Torzewski alleges alcoholism substantially limits major life activities and that remaining in Chicago was necessary to continue treatment/support, enabling him to perform essential job functions. | COSCO contends Torzewski did not show he needed an accommodation to perform essential job functions and that working from Chicago was unreasonable as a matter of law. | Denied dismissal: pleadings plausibly allege Torzewski was "otherwise qualified" and that Chicago-based work could be a reasonable accommodation. |
| ADA discrimination — was termination because of disability? | Termination following leave and the relocation decision was pretextual; timing, prior satisfactory performance, and unique relocation support discriminatory motive. | COSCO asserts the relocation/termination resulted from a business restructuring unrelated to disability. | Denied dismissal: allegations permit inference that relocation was pretext and termination was because of disability. |
| ADA/IHRA retaliation — was termination retaliatory for complaining? | Torzewski claims he complained about ADA rights and was terminated thereafter. | COSCO argues the company decided to terminate if he did not relocate before any complaint; complaint occurred after notice of termination threat. | Granted dismissal: court finds the chronology shows COSCO had decided to terminate for nonrelocation prior to Torzewski’s complaint, so no causal link pleaded. |
| FMLA interference and retaliation — did COSCO interfere with reinstatement or retaliate for taking/ requesting leave? | Torzewski alleges his position was relocated during FMLA leave as a pretext to deny reinstatement to his Chicago position and that he was later fired for seeking reinstatement. | COSCO argues it need not reinstate to the same location if restructuring would have relocated the position regardless of leave. | Denied dismissal: pleaded facts permit inference relocation was pretextual and that he was denied equivalent reinstatement and suffered retaliatory adverse action. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013) (explains "otherwise qualified" requirement and failure‑to‑accommodate framework)
- EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2005) (failure‑to‑accommodate elements)
- Bunn v. Khoury Enter., Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014) (elements of ADA discrimination claim)
- Pagel v. TIN, Inc., 695 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (FMLA interference/retaliation standards)
- Goelzer v. Sheboygan County, Wis., 604 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2010) (reinstatement and effect of business changes during FMLA leave)
- Nawrot v. CPC Int'l, 277 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2002) (pretext and evidence for discrimination inference)