Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306

Background

Police officers approached Roxanne Torres at an Albuquerque apartment complex to execute an arrest warrant; Torres, experiencing methamphetamine withdrawal, entered her vehicle and drove off believing the officers were carjackers.
Officers Madrid and Williamson fired 13 shots at the vehicle; two rounds struck Torres (temporarily paralyzing an arm).
Torres drove about 75 miles to another town, sought medical treatment, was airlifted back to Albuquerque, and was arrested the next day; she later pleaded no contest to state charges arising from the incident.
Torres sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the shooting was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment; the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the officers, holding continued flight after being shot negated a Fourth Amendment seizure.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the application of physical force to a person’s body with an intent to restrain is a Fourth Amendment seizure even if the person does not submit or is not subdued; the case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying physical force (e.g., shooting) with intent to restrain constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" if the suspect does not submit	Torres: shooting is a seizure because officers applied force with intent to restrain	Officers: a seizure requires acquisition of physical control or submission; continued flight means no seizure	Yes. Application of physical force with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit; such a seizure lasts only while force is applied absent submission
Whether Hodari D.'s statement about a "mere touch" is binding or limited dicta	Torres: Hodari D. supports that touching/shooting can be a seizure	Officers: Hodari D.'s "mere touch" passage is dicta and the historical/possession rule governs	Court treats the common-law background (consistent with Hodari D.) as supporting that force with intent to restrain can be a seizure; it reaches this result independently of any dictum being binding
Whether seizures should be assessed only under an "intentional acquisition of control" (Brower) test	Torres: distinct common-law rules govern seizures by force vs. seizures by control; no single acquisition-of-control test needed	Officers: adopt a single acquisition-of-control test for all seizures	Rejected. The Court held seizures by force have a separate common-law pedigree and need not require acquisition of control or submission
Disposition of reasonableness, damages, and qualified immunity	Torres seeks relief on those fronts	Officers argued entitlement to summary judgment on all grounds	Not decided. The Court remanded those questions (reasonableness, damages, qualified immunity) for further proceedings

Key Cases Cited

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (explains common-law view that application of physical force with intent to restrain can constitute an arrest even if the arrestee does not yield)
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (arrest of a person is the quintessential Fourth Amendment seizure)
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (describes seizure by governmental termination of freedom of movement—an acquisition-of-control test)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (accidental force or force applied without intent to restrain does not constitute a seizure)
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (Fourth Amendment inquiries use an objective test for intent to restrain)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (a seizure occurs when an officer, by physical force or show of authority, restrains a person's liberty)
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (Fourth Amendment focuses on individuals’ privacy and security, not the particular method of governmental intrusion)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (discusses historical development of law enforcement’s ability to use deadly force from a distance)