Torres v. Carrese
149 Conn. App. 596
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2014Background
- Erika Torres sued Carrese and Yaari for medical malpractice arising from care during her 2004 pregnancy and cesarean delivery that culminated in bladder and uterine injuries and subsequent hysterectomy.
- Plaintiff alleged negligent prenatal care by Carrese and negligent obstetric care by Yaari, including failures to diagnose placenta previa/accreta and to obtain/coordinate appropriate specialists.
- A September 5, 2006 written opinion letter by a urologist (Motola) opined that obstetricians breached the standard of care; the letter was attached with a good faith certificate under § 52-190a.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under § 52-190a (c) arguing the letter was not written by a ‘similar health care provider’ as defined by § 52-184c (c).
- Supreme Court Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc. (2011) later held the opinion letter must be written by a similar provider regardless of trial-testimony qualifications, prompting renewed motions to dismiss in 2011.
- The trial court granted summary judgments on lack of informed consent claims and subsequently this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Motola’s letter satisfies § 52-190a and § 52-184c | Letter by urologist falls under the exception for non-specialists. | Only a board-certified OB-GYN may author a valid opinion; Motola is not a similar provider. | Letter insufficient; dismissal proper. |
| Whether 2011 motions to dismiss were properly entertained | Untimely motions to reconsider should not be entertained; jurisdiction questioned. | Motions to dismiss were timely as functional motions to reargue in light of Bennett. | Court did not abuse discretion; untimely but proper as reargument under Bennett framework. |
| Carrese's duty to obtain informed consent | Carrese, as prenatal physician, had to inform about risks and future consent for cesarean delivery. | Informed consent duty applies to performing a procedure; prenatal care is not a ‘procedure’. | Carrese had no duty to obtain consent for a future cesarean; no genuine issue. |
| Yaari's duty to disclose tertiary facility option | Yaari should have advised that a tertiary facility with specialists might reduce risks. | Law does not require disclosure of where a procedure is performed; risks of the procedure were disclosed. | Yaari had no obligation to advise about tertiary facilities; no material risk issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1 (2011) (author must be a similar health care provider; dismissal mandatory if not)
- Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282 (1983) (lay standard for materiality in informed consent)
- Duffy v. Flagg, 279 Conn. 682 (2006) (informed consent requires disclosure of material risks in lay terms)
- Shortell v. Cavanagh, 300 Conn. 383 (2011) (materiality determined by lay standard; risks and alternatives context)
- Wilkins v. Connecticut childbirth & Women’s Center, 135 Conn. App. 679 (2012) (defining 'similar health care provider' for § 52-190a analysis)
- Adler v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis.2d 615, 545 N.W.2d 495 (1996) (illustrative case on informed consent and specialization issues)