TORRES-RENDON v. Holder
656 F.3d 456
7th Cir.2011Background
- Torres-Rendon, born in Mexico (1954), entered the U.S. without inspection in 1977 to support his family in Mexico.
- He repeatedly re-entered, married an American woman while still married to his first wife, and obtained lawful permanent resident status in 1984 based on the second marriage.
- In 1987 he was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance; INS charged him with deportability under §241(a)(11).
- deportation proceedings were initially suspended in 1988, and were re-opened only after a 2009 DHS arrest for returning from Mexico.
- In 2009 Torres-Rendon sought waivers under §241(f) and §212(c) and a suspension of deportation under former §244(a)(2); the IJ denied waivers, and the BIA affirmed.
- The BIA and this court focus on whether Torres-Rendon is eligible for the §241(f) waiver, which would validate his LPR status and potentially enable §212(c) relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Torres-Rendon eligible for the §241(f) waiver? | Torres-Rendon argues he is eligible via fraud tied to his LPR status at entry. | Government contends he is ineligible because he was not deportable on fraud grounds and the waiver language requires such grounds at entry. | No; §241(f) does not apply. |
| If §241(f) fails, is Torres-Rendon eligible for §212(c) relief otherwise? | §212(c) relief could be available if §241(f) rendered him LPR eligible. | §212(c) relief is repealed; statutory counterpart limits apply and is unavailable here. | Not available. |
| Whether Torres-Rendon qualifies for suspension of deportation under §244(a)(2) given the stop-time rule. | Should be eligible after ten years of continuous presence, excluding stop-time effects. | Stop-time rule ends continuous presence and precludes ten-year period; he cannot meet the requirement. | Not eligible due to stop-time rule. |
| Does the stop-time rule apply to §244(a)(2) applications generally, and is Okeke distinguishable here? | Okeke suggests recommencement after unlawful re-entry could apply. | Stop-time rule applies to all suspension applications; Torres-Rendon is distinguishable because his status was never lawful. | Stop-time rule applies; no restart in presence. |
Key Cases Cited
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (U.S. 2001) (controls statutory counterpart framework for §212(c))
- Matter of Sosa-Hernandez, 20 I. & N. Dec. 758 (BIA 1993) (waiver can render an LPR status possible for §212(c) eligibility)
- Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000) (stop-time rule applies to suspension proceedings)
- Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005) (Okeke discusses restart of presence post-reentry; court declines to adopt)
- Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (statutory counterpart and deference principles in §212(c) context)
- Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1975) (statutory counterpart approach to relief)
- Briseno-Flores v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (interpretation of continuous presence principles in context)