Torrence Bates v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 964 F.3d 1326

Bates was convicted of manslaughter with a firearm (30-year sentence); the Florida Second DCA affirmed on June 25, 2014 and the 90-day certiorari period to the U.S. Supreme Court expired Sept. 24, 2014.
Bates filed a Florida Rule 3.850 postconviction motion on Mar. 17, 2015 that lacked a required signed oath; the state court dismissed it without prejudice on May 4, 2015 and invited a properly sworn refiling.
Bates filed a compliant Rule 3.850 motion on June 4, 2015; the motion was denied March 4, 2016; the Second DCA affirmed Oct. 26, 2016 (mandate Jan. 26, 2017).
Bates filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 11, 2017; the State moved to dismiss as untimely, arguing tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) began only at the date of the compliant refiling (June 4, 2015).
The district court dismissed the petition relying on Hurley v. Moore (noncompliant 3.850 motion not "properly filed").
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that its later decisions (Green and Hall) require tolling to relate back to the initial filing date when a petitioner is permitted and does later file a compliant motion; the court also addressed application of the 90-day certiorari grace period for Florida per curiam affirmances.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a procedurally defective Rule 3.850 filing that is later cured tolls § 2244(d)(2) from the date of the initial filing	Bates: initial noncompliant filing tolls if state allowed refiling and a compliant motion was later filed	State: tolling begins only when a motion is "properly filed" (the later compliant refiling)	Held: Follow Green and Hall — a later-compliant Rule 3.850 motion relates back to the date of initial filing, so tolling began on the original filing date
Whether Florida petitioners get the 90-day certiorari grace period when the intermediate appellate court issues an unelaborated per curiam affirmance	Bates: yes — per curiam affirmance makes the DCA the court of last resort and petitioner gets 90 days to seek certiorari to U.S. Supreme Court	State: Bond misapplied; 90-day grace should not apply when petitioner could have sought review in state supreme court	Held: 90-day grace applies here because an unelaborated per curiam affirmance bars Florida Supreme Court review, so limitations commences after that 90-day period

Hall v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 921 F.3d 983 (11th Cir. 2019) (tolling under § 2244(d)(2) can relate back to initial noncompliant filing when later cured)
Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2017) (same; compliant refiling relates back for tolling)
Hurley v. Moore, 233 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000) (held a defective 3.850 lacking oath was not "properly filed")
Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 2002) (limitations period ordinarily commences after 90-day certiorari window following direct review)
Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (explains when 90-day grace applies where state supreme court review is unavailable)
Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006) (applies 90-day grace to Florida per curiam affirmances)
United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1993) (panel bound by prior circuit precedent)
Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006) (explains that unelaborated per curiam decisions preclude Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction)