Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031

Torgerson (Native American) and Mundell (female) sued City of Rochester, alleging Title VII and MHRA discrimination in seven firefighter hires, and Torgerson also asserted §1981 claim.
Rochester uses Minnesota civil-service hiring with a 'rule of three' plus optional expanded certification for protected groups under SAFER grant; Phase I–III testing determines eligibility and ranking.
Phases I–II (written and physical tests) plus veterans’ points produced a top eligibility list; Phase III interview added 40% to score; veterans could boost total points to 110, non-veterans capped at 100.
In 2005–2006, three protected-group candidates (including Torgerson and Mundell) were certified for seven positions; Kapler conducted Fire Chief interviews and initially did not recommend three and four, but later recommendations shifted for registry-eligible candidates.
The City ultimately hired seven firefighters (1–3 and 5–8) in March 2006; a media report revealed a convicted felon (Candidate 3) among the top ranks, triggering an emergency council meeting to reconsider.
Council member Carr and others questioned SAFER compliance and the participation of protected-group candidates; subsequent discussions suggested Kapler viewed the felon hire as justified, while Carr raised concerns about SAFER expectations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether title VII/MHRA claims survive summary judgment	Torgerson and Mundell contend the City’s reasons show pretext and discriminatory motive.	City asserts legitimate, non-discriminatory ranking based on scores and qualifications; no pretext established.	Yes, as to pretext issues remain for trial; district court’s summary judgment reversed on Title VII claim (pretext material, jury question).
Whether there was direct evidence of discrimination	Statements by Field and Kapler and others show discriminatory animus tied to protected classes.	Single comments are not direct evidence and may reflect non-discriminatory decisionmaking.	No direct evidence; claims proceed under McDonnell Douglas framework.
Whether the McDonnell Douglas framework was satisfied for pretext	Stated reasons are not supported by the record; subjective interviews and Kapler’s notes show bias.	Stated reasons are fact-based, with objective scoring and consistent processes; insufficient pretext shown.	Mixed analysis; district court erred by resolving credibility; issues of material fact exist about pretext, warranting trial.
Whether §1981 claim against Torgerson fails	Discrimination based on national origin qualifies under §1981.	Section 1981 does not cover national-origin discrimination here; only race/ancestry claims fit.	Held: §1981 claim fails since national origin alone is not actionable under §1981 in this context.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (establishes burden-shifting for summary judgment)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (credibility and inference in summary judgment; pretext evaluation)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for analyzing disparate treatment claims)
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (burden-shifting and pretext considerations after prima facie case)
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (direct vs circumstantial evidence framing in discrimination cases)
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (employer’s management prerogatives in discrimination contexts)
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (pretext showing after prima facie case)
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (purpose and impact of employment tests on fairness)