Tony Speight v. Benjamin W. Griggs, 620 F. App'x 806

Plaintiffs allege their minor son D.M.C. was shot during a physical arrest in a wooded area after a pursuit related to a stolen vehicle.
Officer Griggs approached with a drawn firearm, used a push-kick to bring D.M.C. to the ground, and fired, injuring D.M.C. who was handcuff-free and not resisting.
Georgia Fulton County regulations required safe handling: keep finger outside trigger guard unless using deadly force and avoid hands-on with a drawn weapon.
Griggs admitted his finger was on the trigger and that he fired, though he claimed the shooting was unintentional; timing and actions are contested.
The district court granted summary judgment to Griggs on qualified immunity and to Fulton County on lack of constitutional violation; plaintiffs appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated in part, holding a reasonable jury could infer intent to shoot and remanded for further proceedings; affirmed Monell defense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Griggs' shooting violate the Fourth Amendment?	Griggs intended to fire; excessive force under control/non-resisting standard.	No clearly established right; accident/instinctive reaction defense; not intentional.	Material triable issue; summary judgment vacated, remanded.
Was Griggs' conduct a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation?	Intended to shoot; violated prohibitions on gratuitous force.	No clearly established rule against accidental force; facts unique.	Question for jury; not clearly established.
Can Fulton County be liable under Monell for training/policy failures?	Deliberate indifference via improper training caused the violation.	Training was adequate; single incident insufficient for Monell liability.	Affirmed summary judgment for Fulton on Monell grounds.

Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2015) (establishes standard for reviewing summary judgments in qualified immunity contexts)
Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 2009) (unreasonable-seizure doctrine including excessive force analysis)
Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (excessive force when suspect is under control and obeying commands)
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (intent can be inferred from surrounding circumstances)
Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (intent and force considerations in Fourth Amendment contexts)
Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000) (Longstanding excessive-force principles in restraint scenarios)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (deliberate indifference standard for municipal liability)
City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987) (causal link required between policy and constitutional deprivation)
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (police conduct and entrenchment of rights; jury could infer intent)
United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011) (circumstantial inference of intent in criminal acts)
United States v. Cotton, 770 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1985) (standards for inferring mens rea in extraordinary circumstances)