315 So.3d 959
La. Ct. App.2021Background
- Jones took FMLA medical leave (Mar 25–May 6, 2014), returned May 13, 2014, and alleged supervisor Cisneros created a hostile work environment that led to her resignation on March 10, 2015.
- Jones sued (Sept. 19, 2018) asserting ADA violations, retaliation, and negligence against Cisneros, Delgado Community College, and the Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges.
- Defendants filed exceptions (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of procedural capacity, no cause of action re: certain ADA claims, and prescription).
- The parties entered a consent judgment (June 10, 2019) granting the exceptions and ordering Jones to amend her petition within 21 days.
- Jones filed a second supplemental/amended petition on Sept. 24, 2019 (after the 21-day period); defendants moved to dismiss on Dec. 13, 2019; the trial court granted dismissal (June 9, 2020).
- On appeal the court reversed and remanded, holding the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the entire case for the untimely amendment because dismissal is a draconian remedy, defendants delayed seeking dismissal, and dismissal risked extinguishing substantive ADA claims that could survive the exceptions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal under La. C.C.P. art. 934 was required for Jones’ untimely amendment | Jones: consent-judgment deadline was ambiguous and delay should not mandate dismissal; plaintiff had filed amended petition before defendants moved to dismiss | Defendants: Jones failed to comply with the 21-day order, so dismissal under art. 934 was proper | Court: Dismissal was an abuse of discretion; defendants waited ~3 months to move to dismiss and dismissal is a harsh remedy reserved for extreme circumstances |
| Whether dismissal eliminated any substantive ADA claims that would survive exceptions | Jones: dismissal extinguished potential ADA claims against the Board and improperly cut off substantive rights | Defendants: argued exceptions (no cause of action/prescription) would have disposed of claims anyway | Court: Trial court improperly dismissed the entire suit where it was unclear which ADA claims would have survived—cannot summarily strip plaintiff of substantive rights |
| Whether the trial court properly treated lapse-to-amendment as automatic bar | Jones: lapse does not automatically bar amendment absent prompt defendant action seeking dismissal | Defendants: consent judgment ordered amendment; noncompliance justifies dismissal | Court: The jurisprudence requires some action by defendants or the court; mere lapse alone does not automatically mandate dismissal; court erred in granting dismissal without considering less drastic remedies |
Key Cases Cited
- Liberty Bank And Tr. Co. v. Dapremont, 984 So.2d 152 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2008) (standard of review for motion to dismiss).
- Delacruz v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 157 So.3d 790 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2014) (dismissal is a harsh remedy).
- Horton v. McCary, 635 So.2d 199 (La. 1994) (dismissal reserved for extreme/most culpable conduct).
- First City Bank v. Lee, 576 So.2d 544 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991) (trial court cannot dismiss where substantive rights would be lost).
- Zeno v. HWT Properties, 657 So.2d 1063 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1995) (the ADA is substantive in nature).
- Rourke v. Coursey, 338 So.2d 1197 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1976) (quoted on limits to dismissing without prejudice).