Toni Ball v. City of Indianapolis
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14234
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Toni Ball was arrested based on a probable-cause affidavit prepared by Indianapolis detective Clifton Jones after wiretaps in a drug-gang investigation identified a caller called “Mama Toni.” Charges were dismissed after prosecutors concluded the wrong person had been arrested.
- Ball sued Jones, the City of Indianapolis and its police department, the State of Indiana and the Indiana State Police asserting federal and state claims (§§1981, 1983; Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment; false arrest/imprisonment; perjury, fraud, conspiracy; official misconduct; respondeat superior).
- Defendants removed to federal court. The district court dismissed most federal and state claims (including against municipal and state defendants) and left only Ball’s Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim against Jones.
- Ball moved to amend to drop the remaining federal claim and proceed only on a state-law false-arrest claim against Jones; the district court allowed the amendment and remanded the case to state court under its §1367 discretionary authority.
- Ball appealed the district court’s earlier dismissals and Rule 12(c) rulings. The Seventh Circuit considered jurisdictional issues and then reviewed de novo the district court’s dismissals and judgment on the pleadings, ultimately affirming.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Municipal liability under §1983 (Monell) | Ball argued Jones effectively set municipal policy by drafting/signing affidavit, making City liable. | City argued no municipal policy/custom alleged; an employee’s routine decisional authority does not make him a policymaker. | Affirmed dismissal: no Monell theory pleaded or shown; respondeat superior insufficient. |
| Viability of §1981 claim against government actors | Ball contended §1981 could reach state actors post-1991 Civil Rights Act. | Defendants relied on Jett and precedent that §1983 is the exclusive remedy against state actors for §1981-type claims. | Affirmed dismissal: §1983 is the proper vehicle; §1981 claim dismissed. |
| Indiana Tort Claims Act notice and employee immunity for state and municipal tort claims | Ball argued her claims (false arrest, fraud, perjury, official misconduct) are not mere torts subject to ITCA notice; she sought damages against City and Jones. | Defendants argued ITCA applies; Ball failed to file mandatory 180-day notice against the City; Jones is entitled to immunity if acting within scope of employment. | Affirmed dismissal: claims against City barred for failure to comply with ITCA notice; claims against Jones in his individual capacity barred by ITCA immunity (and pleadings alleged Jones acted within employment scope). |
| State constitutional and statutory claims against State/state police | Ball contended Indiana may permit civil remedies for state-constitutional violations or criminal statutes might provide a remedy. | State defendants argued Indiana has not recognized monetary remedies for state-constitutional violations; sovereign/state cannot be prosecuted criminally by private plaintiff; no standing to pursue criminal prosecutions. | Affirmed dismissal: Ball waived meaningful argument on state-constitutional remedy; no viable statutory/criminal private cause of action against the State; claims dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under §1983 requires a policy or custom)
- Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (States and state officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" under §1983)
- Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (§1983 is the exclusive remedy for claims against state actors that could be brought under §1981)
- Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) (distinguishing remands under §1447(c) from discretionary remands under §1367(c))
- Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (remand orders based on §1447(c) are unreviewable; other remands may be final for appellate review)
- Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (discussed re: finality and reviewability of remand orders)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard for dismissal under Rule 12)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (conclusory allegations insufficient; pleading must contain factual enhancement of plausibility)
- United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (discussion of the nature of torts and remedies)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (remand/stay jurisprudence and finality considerations)