561 F. App'x 342
5th Cir.2014Background
- Tommy Lynn Sells was convicted and sentenced to death for the December 31, 1999 capital murder of Kaylene Harris; execution scheduled for April 3, 2014.
- On April 1, 2014 Sells filed a § 1983 complaint and moved for a TRO, preliminary injunction, and stay, arguing inadequate disclosure about the pentobarbital to be used in his execution.
- Sells sought detailed information about the drug: source, purchase records, storage, manufacture date/lot numbers, ingredients, testing, and testing lab/personnel.
- State disclosed its July 9, 2012 TDCJ execution procedure: a five-gram dose of pentobarbital from a licensed U.S. compounding pharmacy, batch tested by an independent lab showing 108% potency and no contaminants; same protocol used in recent Texas executions.
- The district court granted the injunction and stay; the State appealed and moved to vacate the stay.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Sells showed a substantial likelihood of success on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and whether irreparable harm and balance of equities favored relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State's secrecy about the compounded pentobarbital violates the Eighth Amendment by creating a substantial risk of severe pain | Sells: lack of disclosure about the drug and new compounder creates a risk of improper compounding, contamination, or potency problems leading to severe pain | State: TDCJ protocol and independent lab test show potency and absence of contaminants; drug is commonly used and protocol approved in prior cases | Denied — speculation about risks insufficient; plaintiff failed to show a substantial likelihood of success under Baze |
| Whether due process requires disclosure of execution-drug procurement and testing details | Sells: due process entitles him to information to assess risk and prepare challenges | State: secrecy does not create a constitutional violation; provided procedural safeguards and testing results | Denied — uncertainty alone does not establish a due-process violation (Sepulvado controls) |
| Whether a preliminary injunction/stay is warranted given likelihood of success and balance of harms | Sells: imminent execution and alleged risk warrant extraordinary relief | State: interest in carrying out sentence and showing testing/controls outweigh speculative claims | Denied — plaintiffs did not meet the preliminary-injunction/stay standards; injunction and stay vacated |
| Standard for assessing scientific/speculative evidence in execution-method claims | Sells: expert reports alleging risks from compounding pharmacies and grey-market ingredients show real danger | State: such expert assertions are speculative and insufficient without scientific proof of substantial risk | Court: plaintiffs must present scientific/factual evidence showing a substantial risk compared to alternatives; speculation is insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (Eighth Amendment requires showing substantial risk of severe pain compared to alternatives)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (stay factors include likelihood of success, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and public interest)
- Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987) (stay-of-execution equitable factors)
- Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2013) (expert evidence about compounded pentobarbital insufficient for preliminary injunction)
- Thorsen v. Epps, 701 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding Texas single-drug protocol under Baze)
- Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013) (secrecy about execution protocol alone does not violate due process)
- Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (federal courts should protect states from dilatory or speculative suits)
- Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for preliminary injunctions)
- Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009) (legal-errors in injunction decisions reviewed de novo)
- Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (elements required for preliminary injunction)
