Tom Tuduj v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 17-1941

In May 2006 Tuduj began taking Wellbutrin XL, Ambien CR, and propranolol; within a week he developed psychotic symptoms and on May 16, 2006 murdered his boss.
He was diagnosed psychotic in custody, stopped the medications a month later and the symptoms ceased; he was convicted of first‑degree murder in 2009 and the conviction was affirmed on appeal in 2014.
In 2015 (nine years after the murder) Tuduj sued the manufacturers for failure to warn, alleging the drugs caused homicidal impulses and that defendants fraudulently concealed risks.
Defendants moved to dismiss as time‑barred, and also argued issue preclusion and failure to state a claim; the magistrate judge dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely, assuming plaintiff’s facts were true but finding tolling doctrines inapplicable.
The court of appeals reviewed de novo, accepted Tuduj’s pleaded facts as true, and affirmed dismissal because limitations periods accrued no later than 2006 (or 2009 at the latest) and expired before the 2015 complaint.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When did limitations accrue under Illinois law?	Accrual did not occur until 2014 when Tuduj learned of disclosures about the drugs.	Accrual occurred in 2006 (or 2009 at latest) when symptoms and causal facts were known.	Accrual began in 2006; at latest by 2009. Discovery rule doesn’t save him.
Is the discovery rule applicable to this injury?	Injury was latent until he learned of defendants’ disclosures, so discovery rule should toll limitations.	The psychotic breakdown was a sudden traumatic event, not a latent injury.	Discovery rule inapplicable to sudden events; inquiry notice arose in 2006.
Can fraudulent concealment toll the limitations period?	Defendants’ public assurances and nondisclosure concealed the risks until 2014.	Tuduj did not rely on defendants’ assurances; he believed the drugs caused his breakdown earlier.	Fraudulent‑concealment tolling fails because Tuduj already knew or had inquiry notice and did not rely on concealment.
Was dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) proper vs. affirmative‑defense procedural error?	Dismissal premature; statute‑of‑limitations is an affirmative defense better resolved on summary judgment.	The complaint’s allegations, accepted as true, nonetheless established that tolling doctrines were legally insufficient.	Proper: where pleaded facts still establish an affirmative defense, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate.

Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2011) (standard for construing complaints on Rule 12(b)(6))
Aebischer v. Stryker Corp., 535 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Illinois discovery rule for latent injuries)
Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2006) (sudden traumatic events put plaintiffs on immediate notice)
Golla v. General Motors Corp., 657 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 1995) (presumption that sudden event triggers accrual)
Mitsias v. I‑Flow Corp., 959 N.E.2d 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (facts prompting inquiry notice and triggering limitations)
Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2003) (continuing‑violation doctrine in Illinois)
Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2012) (when complaint pleads facts establishing an affirmative defense, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (civil suits cannot be used to effectively invalidate a criminal conviction)