9 F.4th 675
8th Cir.2021Background
- Benjamin Harris was a U.S. Postal Service mail carrier with a prescribed route and written policies requiring carriers to follow authorized lines of travel and forbidding unauthorized deviations for personal purposes.
- Carriers were allowed two ten-minute personal breaks at designated locations; one of Harris’s designated break locations was Owens’s address.
- On June 1, 2016, Harris left his route for ~25 minutes to buy dog food and a beverage, delivered the dog food to Owens, took a personal break at Owens’s residence, and then accidentally drove into Owens while leaving.
- The Postal Service investigated, proposed Harris’s removal for unsafe vehicle operation and unauthorized deviation; Harris later settled a grievance and received a 14-day suspension.
- Owens sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and sued Harris under Missouri negligence law; the district court dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (finding Harris acted outside the scope of employment) and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Harris was not acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Harris was acting within the scope of employment for FTCA jurisdiction | Harris/Owens: Harris was on an authorized break at a designated location and thus within scope | USPS/Harris: Harris deviated from route for a personal errand in violation of policy, removing him from scope | Court: Not within scope; FTCA jurisdiction lacking |
| Whether the driving-vehicle presumption (employer vehicle = within scope) applies | Owens: Presumption applies because Harris was driving a USPS vehicle | USPS: Presumption rebutted by substantial contrary evidence (policies, unauthorized detour, personal errand) | Court: Presumption rebutted; evidence shows unauthorized personal deviation |
| Whether the deviation was minor (incidental) or material (marked and decided) | Owens: Any deviation was minor or Harris had returned to scope by the accident | USPS: Deviation was definite, lasted ~25 minutes, multiple stops, ended away from route — material | Court: Deviation was material, not slight or incidental; removed Harris from scope |
| Whether scope-of-employment is a jury question or an antecedent jurisdictional question for the court | Magee/Owens: Jury should decide scope of employment | USPS: Court must decide threshold jurisdictional issue without trial | Court: Scope is a threshold jurisdictional question for the court here; no trial required |
Key Cases Cited
- Cluck v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 367 S.W.3d 25 (Mo. 2012) (scope-of-employment requires act be by virtue of employment and in furtherance of employer’s business)
- Higgenbotham v. Pit Stop Bar & Grill, LLC, 548 S.W.3d 323 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (acts must be fairly and naturally incident to employer’s business)
- Ewing-Cage v. Quality Prods., Inc., 18 S.W.3d 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (presumption that employee driving employer vehicle is acting within scope unless rebutted)
- Brown v. Moore, 248 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1952) (distinguishes slight/incidental deviations from marked and decided deviations)
- American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arnold Muffler, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (minor, brief deviations that return to business purpose may remain within scope)
- Schulte v. Grand Union Tea & Coffee Co., 43 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) (returning vehicle to employer service can restore scope of employment in some circumstances)
- Humphrey v. Hogan, 104 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937) (employee generally must return to point of deviation or a place proper to duties to resume scope)
- Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2008) (FTCA scope-of-employment question governed by state law)
- Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1990) (court decides jurisdictional questions unless they are intertwined with the merits)