Tollie Carter v. Chicago State University, 778 F.3d 651

Carter, an African-American tenured associate professor and former department chair at Chicago State University (CSU), took FMLA leave Jan–Mar 2008 to care for his mother. He previously sued CSU in 2007 alleging race, gender, and disability discrimination (Carter I).
In spring 2008 the Department of Accounting & Finance held a faculty vote for chair: Carter and Coupet tied; Coupet withdrew then agreed to reconsider and was recommended by Dean Simyar and appointed chair in May 2008. Coupet resigned in August 2008.
In November 2008 Dean Simyar appointed Atha Hunt as acting chair (dean-appointed; no formal faculty vote or stated degree requirement for acting chairs).
Carter sued CSU, Simyar, and Tolia alleging retaliation (FMLA and Section 1981) for not appointing him chair (May) and acting chair (Nov). The chair claim went to jury (verdict for defendants); the acting-chair claim was dismissed on summary judgment and denial of reconsideration, which Carter appealed.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed whether Carter produced sufficient evidence (direct or indirect methods) to show a causal connection between protected activity (FMLA leave and prior lawsuit) and the failure-to-appoint acting chair, and whether Hunt was similarly situated or less qualified than Carter.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CSU retaliated in violation of the FMLA by not appointing Carter acting chair (Nov 2008)	Carter: temporal proximity to his FMLA leave and post-leave disputes supports an inference of retaliation	CSU: seven-month gap, intervening events, and lack of other evidence make causation speculative	Held: No. Seven-month gap plus no corroborating evidence insufficient to show causation under direct or indirect methods
Whether Simyar retaliated in violation of Section 1981 by not appointing Carter acting chair	Carter: pending prior discrimination suit, Simyar’s remarks and preference for other candidates show animus and pretext	Simyar: selection was discretionary; statement about complaints was not animus; proffered reason (appointed Hunt) legitimate	Held: No. Plaintiff failed to show discriminatory intent or that Hunt was less qualified; summary judgment for Simyar affirmed
Whether Carter’s motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment was wrongly denied	Carter: trial court abused discretion in denying reconsideration	Defendants: summary judgment was proper so reconsideration denial was moot	Held: Dismissed as interlocutory of no effect—summary judgment is affirmed so reconsideration appeal is dismissed

Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745 (7th Cir.) (summary judgment standard)
Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.) (FMLA prohibits retaliation/interference)
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (Sup. Ct.) (Section 1981 authorizes retaliation claims)
Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir.) (retaliation definition under §1981)
Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779 (7th Cir.) (elements for retaliation claims)
Tank v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 800 (7th Cir.) (pretext and direct evidence analysis)
Hutt v. AbbVie Products LLC, 757 F.3d 687 (7th Cir.) (circumstantial evidence categories for direct method)
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir.) (temporal proximity alone rarely sufficient)
Naficy v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504 (7th Cir.) (long gaps undermine temporal inference)
Jajeh v. County of Cook, 678 F.3d 560 (7th Cir.) (timing gaps and causation)
Leonard v. E. Ill. Univ., 606 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.) (six-month lag too long for inference)
Vaughn v. Vilsack, 715 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir.) (prima facie elements for retaliation under indirect method)
Gordon v. United Air Lines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878 (7th Cir.) (pretext inquiry)