Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276

Joseph Toler, a long‑time supervisor at Süd‑Chemie, was fired after coworkers reported he used racist language; Toler denied the statements and sued the company and coworkers for defamation (per se).
The company HR director investigated, collected written statements from employees, met with Toler (naming the complainants), and terminated Toler the next day under a zero‑tolerance policy.
At trial, the court directed a verdict for the Company and one coworker on qualified‑privilege grounds; the jury found for the remaining coworkers (either truth or no malice).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict but reversed the directed verdict, holding a prima facie showing of falsity was enough to defeat a directed verdict against a privileged defendant.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted review to clarify the role of qualified privilege and held that to survive a directed‑verdict motion a plaintiff must produce some evidence of the defendant’s actual malice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of falsity to defeat a defendant’s directed‑verdict motion when the defendant asserts a qualified privilege	Toler argued falsity alone (per se defamation) should suffice to send privilege abuse to the jury	Company argued qualified privilege negates the presumption of malice and plaintiff must present evidence of actual malice to survive directed verdict	Court held plaintiff must produce some evidence of actual malice (malice in fact) to overcome qualified privilege on directed‑verdict motion; prima facie falsity alone is insufficient
Whether the Company abused its qualified privilege such that a directed verdict was improper	Toler argued the Company’s actions (and the employees’ motives) showed malice or abuse of privilege (union vendetta, collusion)	Company argued it investigated, followed policy, and did not excessively publish or act with malice	Court held no evidence of Company malice or abuse of privilege; directed verdict for Company was appropriate
Adequacy of jury instructions on actual malice and privilege	Toler argued instructions omitted improper‑motive permutations and mischaracterized malice standards	Company argued instructions defined actual malice (knowledge or reckless disregard) and were substantively correct	Court held instructions were clumsy but substantially correct and adequate; jury verdict for employees affirmed

Stringer v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781 (Ky. 2004) (discusses qualified privilege and jury’s role in abuse/malice determinations)
Harstad v. Whiteman, 338 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (explains plaintiff’s burden to present evidence of malice to defeat privilege on summary judgment/direct‑verdict analog)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitutional actual‑malice standard for public‑figure defamation; distinguished here)
Dossett v. New York Min. & Mfg. Co., 451 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1970) (application of qualified privilege in employment investigations)