Tolentino v. Gillig, LLC, 3:20-cv-07427

Tolentino worked for Gillig as a maintenance employee from 2002–2020 and sued in Alameda County Superior Court alleging unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, missed meal and rest breaks, untimely final wages, inaccurate wage statements/records, waiting-time penalties, and UCL violations.
Gillig removed under federal question jurisdiction, asserting LMRA § 301 preemption because Tolentino was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Teamsters Local 853.
The CBA was judicially noticed and includes provisions on pay schedule, overtime premium rates (meeting Cal. Lab. Code § 514), rest breaks, and a multi-step grievance/arbitration procedure culminating in binding arbitration.
The Court applied the Ninth Circuit two-step § 301 preemption test (whether the right exists independently of the CBA; if so, whether resolution requires interpreting the CBA) and analyzed each cause of action accordingly.
The Court held Tolentino’s overtime and untimely-pay claims are preempted by § 301 and dismissed them with prejudice for failure to exhaust the CBA grievance/arbitration procedure; minimum-wage and rest-break claims were not preempted and were remanded to state court.
Remaining claims derivative of the preempted claims were dismissed; non-derivative state-law claims were remanded because the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal/preempted claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether removal was proper under § 301 LMRA preemption	Tolentino: Gillig failed to establish § 301 preemption	Gillig: CBA preempts state-law claims; federal jurisdiction exists	Court: Removal proper as to preempted claims; remand denied overall but non-preempted claims remanded after dismissal of preempted claims
Whether overtime and untimely-pay claims are § 301-preempted	Tolentino: state statutory rights independent of CBA	Gillig: § 514 and CBA supply overtime/pay terms so rights exist solely from CBA	Held preempted; those claims dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust CBA grievance/arbitration
Whether minimum-wage and rest-break claims are § 301-preempted	Tolentino: rights arise under state law (Lab. Code) and do not require CBA interpretation	Gillig: resolution requires substantial CBA interpretation (pay rates, break terms)	Not preempted; retained as state-law claims and ultimately remanded to state court
Whether failure to exhaust CBA grievance/arbitration bars relief	Tolentino: no clear and unmistakable waiver of judicial forum for statutory claims	Gillig: Tolentino failed to grieve/arbitrate as required by CBA	For CBA-governed (preempted) claims, failure to exhaust required dismissal with prejudice; amendment futile; state claims remanded

Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (two-step inquiry for § 301 preemption and distinguishing rights created by CBA versus state law)
Curtis v. Irwin Industries, Inc., 913 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (clarifies look-to versus interpret standard for § 301 preemption)
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (consulting a CBA for damages calculations does not itself preempt a state-law claim)
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (state-law claims preempted by § 301 should be pursued under the CBA grievance/arbitration if so provided)
Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001) (failure to pursue binding arbitration under CBA may justify dismissal with prejudice)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard requiring plausible claim for relief)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard applied to factual allegations)
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988) (§ 301 preemption can displace state-law claims involving CBA interpretation)