Toledo v. Sklarov, 2017 Ohio 137

Sharon Sklarov was charged by the City of Toledo with three violations of Toledo Municipal Code §1726.08 (failure to obey abatement order); complaints filed December 30, 2014.
Trial was scheduled and ultimately held October 22, 2015 in Toledo Municipal Court; on the morning of trial Sklarov moved to dismiss for violation of her speedy-trial rights.
The municipal court conducted a bench trial, found Sklarov guilty, imposed fines and ordered restitution; the court denied the speedy-trial dismissal motion.
Sklarov argued on appeal that (1) her statutory speedy-trial time was exceeded, and (2) she was not an owner/operator under the municipal code (the latter rendered moot by the court).
The Sixth District focused on a 49-day unexplained delay between September 3, 2015 and October 22, 2015 that the city conceded must be charged to the state and that alone exceeded the 45-day limit applicable to third-degree misdemeanors.
Court reversed, vacated conviction for violation of speedy-trial statutes, and ordered the city to pay appellate costs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Toledo)	Defendant's Argument (Sklarov)	Held
Was Sklarov brought to trial within the statutory speedy-trial period?	Trial was timely; court’s calculation of 37 days was correct and Sklarov acquiesced.	Trial exceeded statutory time (appellant asserted 199–296 days; at minimum exceeded 45 days).	Held for Sklarov: unexplained 49-day gap charged to state; speedy-trial violation.
Proper classification of the offense (minor misdemeanor v. third-degree misdemeanor)?	The trial court treated it as third-degree misdemeanor.	Sklarov argued it was a minor misdemeanor (shorter speedy-trial window).	Not decided as dispositive; court assumed third-degree timing but found violation even under that longer period.
Did Sklarov waive her speedy-trial claim by focusing on offense classification at trial?	City argued waiver/acquiescence to court’s day count.	Sklarov preserved claim by moving to dismiss and arguing the elapsed days; she did not waive the day-count challenge.	Held Sklarov did not waive the speedy-trial day-count argument.
Were continuances attributable to Sklarov that tolled the speedy-trial clock?	City contended continuances/motions by defendant justified scheduling.	Sklarov contended record lacks reasons attributable to her; city produced no evidence.	Held no record support that September–October continuances were defendant-caused; time charged to state.

State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 416 N.E.2d 589 (speedy-trial statutes implement constitutional speedy-trial right)
State v. Reeser, 63 Ohio St.2d 189, 407 N.E.2d 25 (court and prosecution have mandatory duty to comply with speedy-trial statutes)
State v. Pudlock, 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524 (extensions of speedy-trial time must be recorded to charge defendant)
State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 780 N.E.2d 186 (necessity and reasons for continuances must be recorded)
State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 441 N.E.2d 571 (recording continuances requirement)
State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 357 N.E.2d 1095 (syllabus on continuance recording)
State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 715 N.E.2d 540 (extensions strictly construed against the state)
State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 500 N.E.2d 1368 (burden shifts to prosecution once defendant makes prima facie showing)
State v. McClain, 41 N.E.3d 871 (discussing preservation/waiver of speedy-trial arguments)
State v. Turner, 168 Ohio App.3d 176, 858 N.E.2d 1249 (same)