Todd v. Collecto, Inc.
731 F.3d 734
7th Cir.2013Background
- Plaintiff Michael Todd received a recorded message from Collecto and, when he called, a Collecto representative told him Todd’s mother (Terry) owed AT&T money. Todd said he was not Terry but the collector continued discussing the alleged debt.
- Todd alleges emotional harm and contends the disclosure was intended to prompt him to pay or persuade his mother to pay.
- Todd sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), invoking 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2) (prohibiting disclosure of a consumer’s debt to third parties) and § 1692f (prohibiting unfair or unconscionable collection practices).
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding Todd lacked standing because he was not the debtor whose information was disclosed.
- The Seventh Circuit evaluated (1) whether § 1692b(2) protects non-debtors and (2) whether non-debtors can sue under § 1692f; it affirmed dismissal but on split grounds: no standing under § 1692b(2), standing under § 1692f but no plausible § 1692f claim on the facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1692b(2) grants standing to a non-debtor who heard disclosure of another’s debt | Todd: §1692b(2) protects any aggrieved recipient of a disclosure, so he may sue | Collecto: §1692b(2) is a privacy protection for the consumer whose debt was disclosed, not third parties | Held: No — §1692b(2) protects only the consumer (debtor); Todd lacks standing under §1692b(2) |
| Whether § 1692f permits suits by non-debtors injured by unfair collection practices | Todd: §1692f’s broad prohibition on unfair or unconscionable practices covers any aggrieved person | Collecto: FDCPA claims should be limited to consumers or those who stand in their shoes | Held: Yes — §1692f can protect any person aggrieved by unfair practices; Todd has standing under §1692f |
| Whether Todd’s allegations plausibly state an unfair or unconscionable practice under §1692f | Todd: Disclosure and implied solicitation to get him to pay/pressure his mother suffice as unfair conduct | Collecto: The facts show only a disclosure; no demand, threat, or unconscionable conduct toward Todd | Held: No — the alleged single disclosure, without request for payment or coercion, fails to plausibly state a §1692f violation against Todd |
| Whether O’Rourke bars FDCPA claims by non-consumers generally | Todd: O’Rourke should not foreclose non-consumer claims across the FDCPA | Collecto/District Court: Interpreted O’Rourke broadly to bar non-consumer FDCPA claims | Held: O’Rourke limited — it does not categorically bar non-consumer claims; each FDCPA provision’s scope must be assessed individually |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938 (7th Cir.) (contextualized; broad language about consumers should not be overread)
- Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693 (6th Cir.) (analysis distinguishing provisions that protect "any person" from those that protect only consumers)
- Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Assoc., Inc., 330 F.3d 991 (7th Cir.) (standard for when collection practices are objectively unfair or unconscionable)
- FTC v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.) (describing egregious practice of contacting family members and demanding payment)
- Zemeckis v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 679 F.3d 632 (7th Cir.) (applying Iqbal pleading standard to FDCPA claims)
- Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F.3d 470 (7th Cir.) (describing §1692f’s catch-all as vague)
- Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.) (standing limited to plaintiff within statute’s zone of interests)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard cited for plausibility review)
