Todd Peterson v. Timothy Douma
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8524
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Todd Peterson was convicted in Wisconsin of first-degree sexual assault of a child based largely on the victim M.W.’s testimony and corroborating witnesses; Peterson did not testify.
- At trial, an off-duty police officer and Big Brothers Big Sisters volunteer, Trisha Liethen, confronted Peterson at the victim’s home; Peterson said, “that wasn’t when that happened.” Liethen then told him to stay put and called on-duty police.
- Peterson’s trial attorney neither cross-examined Liethen about that statement nor moved to suppress it under Miranda; other-acts evidence about prior similar abuses was admitted and limiting instructions were given.
- After conviction and a life sentence, Peterson pursued state postconviction relief and federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and due process errors; the district court denied relief and initially denied a certificate of appealability (COA).
- The Seventh Circuit granted a narrow COA limited to whether counsel’s failure to move to suppress Peterson’s statement deprived him of Sixth Amendment effective assistance, and considered whether to expand the COA to other issues raised by Peterson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Peterson’s statement to Liethen under Miranda (custodial interrogation) | Peterson: knowing Liethen was a police officer and being told to come up and later to stay made the encounter custodial; counsel should have moved to suppress | State: Peterson was not in custody during the relevant exchange (Liethen was off-duty, not in uniform or displaying police authority); suppression motion would likely fail | Held: COA granted on this issue but the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland; counsel’s performance and prejudice determinations were not unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1) |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not cross-examining Liethen about the statement | Peterson: counsel should have clarified whether Liethen understood the statement as a confession | State: Cross-examination choices are strategic; pursuing it risked emphasizing the statement | Held: Not certified — strategic choice reasonable; no substantial showing of constitutional error |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not challenging the indictment’s six-month window (alibi) | Peterson: broad charging window foreclosed presentation of a five-day alibi trip | State: Alibi was weak given corroborating testimony and Peterson’s own signed statement placing the child with him | Held: Not certified — even if error, no prejudice from a weak alibi defense |
| Whether admission of other-acts evidence violated due process | Peterson: admission denied fair trial under Fourteenth Amendment | State: District court found claim procedurally defaulted; trial court held pretrial hearing, excluded some evidence, gave limiting instructions | Held: Not certified — procedurally defaulted and no clearly established Supreme Court precedent showing unreasonable application by state court |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective assistance of counsel test: performance and prejudice)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial interrogation requires warnings before admissible statements)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (review under AEDPA: asks whether reasonable jurists could disagree with state court’s application of federal law)
- Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (custody determination is objective: whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave)
- Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (statements made before custodial arrest are admissible without Miranda warnings)
- Bailey v. Lemke, 735 F.3d 945 (Strickland prejudice inquiry is objective and can’t rest solely on trial judge’s view)
- United States v. Jackson, 546 F.3d 801 (cross-examination questions are a matter of trial strategy)
- Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838 (failure to seek suppression of clearly unconstitutional search can be objectively unreasonable)