Todd Michael v. City of Troy Police Dep't, 808 F.3d 304

Background

Todd Michael, a Troy, Michigan patrol officer since 1987, had a non‑cancerous brain tumor and multiple surgeries (2000, 2001, 2009). After the 2009 surgery the City required psychological clearance before returning to duty.
From 2007–2009 Michael displayed a pattern of unusual conduct (secret recordings of others, litigation over steroid vials, allegations regarding wife, reports he accompanied a drug dealer), which raised supervisory concerns about judgment.
The City ordered neuropsychological evaluations. Drs. Firoza Van Horn and Bradley Sewick (retained by the City) concluded Michael may be a threat to himself/others and unfit for patrol duties; the City placed him on unpaid leave.
Other medical reviewers (Dr. Philip Liethen, and two physicians reviewing for Michael’s insurer) concluded Michael could return to duty; Michael did not disclose one additional unfavorable report (Dr. Bieliauskas) to the City.
Michael sued under the ADA claiming the City regarded him as disabled and unlawfully discriminated; the district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Sixth Circuit majority affirmed; Judge Gilman dissented and would remand for trial.

Issues

Issue	Michael's Argument	City of Troy's Argument	Held
Whether Michael was a "qualified individual" under the ADA (can perform essential job functions or poses an unmitigable direct threat)	Michael: medical opinions favorable to him show Van Horn/Sewick were wrong; factual disputes exist about reasonableness of City’s reliance — creates triable issue	City: relied on objectively reasonable medical opinions (Van Horn, Sewick) and on Michael’s aberrant behavior; therefore Michael posed a direct threat and was not qualified	Majority: Affirmed — City reasonably relied on objectively reasonable opinions and on conduct; Michael not a qualified individual as a matter of law. Dissent: Disagrees; factual disputes create triable issue.
Whether employer may rely on one medical opinion when others conflict	Michael: conflicting expert opinions that directly criticize Van Horn/Sewick show their opinions were not objectively reasonable	City: law permits reliance on any objectively reasonable medical opinion even if others disagree	Majority: Employer may rely on an objectively reasonable opinion; Van Horn and Sewick were objectively reasonable here. Dissent: The contradictory experts raise a genuine dispute about objective reasonableness and thus preclude summary judgment.
Whether nonmedical behavioral evidence alone can support a direct‑threat finding	Michael: his behavior was odd but not as extreme as in precedent (e.g., Amego); medical evidence contradicts direct‑threat conclusion	City: Michael’s recorded conduct, litigation, and other incidents corroborate medical concerns and justify precaution	Majority: Behavioral evidence, combined with medical opinions, made City’s decision objectively reasonable. Dissent: The behavior was not as extreme as Amego and, together with conflicting medical evidence, creates triable issues.
Standard for what makes a medical opinion an "individualized inquiry"	Michael: favors a broad view; several doctors addressed fitness for duty and thus conducted individualized inquiries	City: emphasizes the City’s examiners’ detailed, job‑specific evaluations	Majority: Some of Michael’s experts lacked discussion of specific patrol duties; their reports weaker on job‑specific analysis. Dissent: Those experts did address fitness for police duties and satisfy the individualized‑inquiry standard; district court erred imposing rigid extra requirements.

Key Cases Cited

Keith v. County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2013) (defines "individualized inquiry" for ADA fitness analysis)
Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2000) (employer’s reliance on medical opinion unreasonable where record flatly contradicts it)
Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998) (definition of direct threat exception to "qualified individual")
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1998) (medical opinion may conflict with others but remain objectively reasonable if supported)
Darnell v. Thermafiber, Inc., 417 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2005) (employer’s reliance on reasonable medical judgment supports direct‑threat determination)
EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997) (behavioral evidence can alone justify direct‑threat finding where conduct poses obvious/extreme danger)
Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2007) (review focuses on objective reasonableness of employer’s decision)