Todd McNally v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado
17-1
| 10th Cir. BAP | Sep 15, 2017Background
- In 2006 Michael Carns invested $700,000 in a Florida shopping-center project promoted by Todd McNally; the project failed and Carns obtained a $700,000 default judgment in 2008.
- McNally filed Chapter 7 in Colorado on August 6, 2014; he initially omitted Carns from the creditor matrix but on August 18, 2014 amended Schedule F to list Carns “c/o James D. Gibson” and mailed notice to Gibson. Gibson claimed he never received the mailing and did not forward it.
- The deadline to object to dischargeability passed and McNally received his discharge on November 13, 2014. Carns learned of the bankruptcy later and moved to reopen the case; he filed an adversary complaint seeking revocation of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) and nondischargeability of the judgment debt.
- At trial the bankruptcy court found (1) McNally did not act with fraudulent intent in his schedules, and some alleged omissions were not material, so revocation under § 727(d)(1) failed; and (2) notice mailed to Carns’ counsel Gibson was sufficient, so Carns’ § 523(a)(3) nondischargeability claim failed.
- The district BAP affirmed: it declined to disturb credibility findings on intent, found the mailbox presumption unrebutted, and concluded notice to counsel was reasonably calculated to apprise Carns.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carns) | Defendant's Argument (McNally) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether discharge must be revoked under § 727(d)(1) based on alleged false oaths/omissions (fraud & materiality) | McNally omitted material assets (VAL interest, transfers, FX accounts, book royalties), showing fraudulent intent and material omissions warranting revocation | Omissions were inadvertent or immaterial; debtor lacked fraudulent intent and was credible | Court held no fraudulent intent; materiality findings not disturbed; § 727(d)(1) claim denied and affirmed on appeal |
| Whether Carns’ debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(3) because he lacked timely notice (mailed to former/agent counsel) and thus could not timely file a complaint | Mailing to Gibson did not provide Carns constitutionally adequate notice because Gibson was no longer representing Carns; therefore § 523(a)(3) exception applies | Mailing to Gibson was reasonably calculated to give notice: Gibson continued to represent Carns on collection matters, mailbox presumption applies, and notice to counsel is ordinarily sufficient | Court held notice to Gibson was sufficient under § 342(a) and due process; § 523(a)(3) claim denied and affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Calder v. United States Trustee, 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1990) (material omission from schedules can be a false oath barring discharge)
- Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (bankruptcy relies on full, truthful disclosure by debtor)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties)
- In re Schicke, 290 B.R. 792 (10th Cir. BAP 2003) (notice mailed to creditor’s attorney is ordinarily sufficient when attorney is agent in enforcement/collection matters)
- United States Trustee v. Garland (In re Garland), 417 B.R. 805 (10th Cir. BAP 2009) (discussing inference of fraudulent intent and badges of fraud)
