446 P.3d 654
Wash. Ct. App.2019Background
- Todd McLaughlin was injured on July 31, 2017 when a parked motorist opened a car door and struck him while he was riding a bicycle on a Seattle street.
- McLaughlin submitted a claim under his Travelers California Personal Auto policy for Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits (up to $5,000) covering medical expenses for an "insured."
- The policy defined an "insured" to include "a pedestrian when struck by" a motor vehicle; the policy did not define "pedestrian."
- Travelers denied coverage on the ground that McLaughlin was riding a bicycle (a cyclist), not a pedestrian, and sued was resolved by cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted Travelers' motion, concluding the ordinary meaning of "pedestrian" excludes bicyclists; McLaughlin appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an undefined policy term "pedestrian" includes a bicyclist for PIP coverage | McLaughlin: dictionary and policy context should include bicyclists as pedestrians | Travelers: plain, ordinary meaning (pedestrian = person on foot) excludes bicyclists | Court: "pedestrian" plain meaning excludes bicyclists; no coverage |
| Whether RCW 48.22.005(11) (Insurance Code) supplies a broader statutory definition making bicyclists pedestrians under the policy | McLaughlin: the statute's definition should be incorporated and include bicyclists | Travelers: statute does not compel broader meaning; Title 46 definitions treat bicyclists as vehicles | Court: RCW 48.22.005(11) refers to Title 46; harmonized reading excludes bicyclists |
| Whether out-of-state or other authority requires treating bicyclists as pedestrians for contract interpretation | McLaughlin: cites other jurisdictions and cases treating bicyclists as pedestrians | Travelers: those authorities rely on different statutes or doctrines (reasonable expectations) not adopted here | Court: those authorities unpersuasive and not controlling |
| Whether any ambiguity exists requiring contra proferentem construction | McLaughlin: term ambiguous; ambiguity should be construed against insurer | Travelers: term is not ambiguous under dictionary or statutory reading | Court: no ambiguity; contra proferentem not applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Kut Suen Lui v. Essex Ins. Co., 375 P.3d 596 (Wash. 2016) (summary judgment and de novo review of insurance contract interpretation)
- Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1989) (undefined policy terms given plain, ordinary, popular meaning)
- Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 733 (Wash. 2005) (contract interpreted as whole; insured's expectations cannot override plain language)
- E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 726 P.2d 439 (Wash. 1986) (insured bears burden to prove coverage)
- Pudmaroff v. Allen, 977 P.2d 574 (Wash. 1999) (contextual statutory interpretation recognizing bicyclists may be treated as pedestrians in crosswalk cases)
- Barriga Figueroa v. Prieto Mariscal, 441 P.3d 818 (Wash. 2019) (discussion of insured status under PIP statute; court did not resolve whether bicyclist is a pedestrian)
We affirm the trial court: under the plain meaning and harmonized statutory reading, a bicyclist is not a "pedestrian" for purposes of the undefined term in this PIP policy, so McLaughlin was not an insured and is not entitled to PIP benefits.