378 P.3d 611
Wyo.2016Background
- On Aug. 14, 2014, Todd Lee Harnden drank vodka, went to the Laramie Walmart to exchange a propane tank, became impatient, and went into the garden center.
- Harnden opened a bottle of lighter fluid, poured it on a bag of charcoal, and ignited it; firefighters extinguished the blaze and he was later arrested and admitted starting the fire because he was upset.
- Harnden was tried twice (first trial hung); at the second trial a jury convicted him of first-degree arson and the court sentenced him to 10–18 years' imprisonment.
- First-degree arson under Wyoming law requires maliciously starting a fire with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.
- Harnden argued on appeal that his intoxication prevented formation of the specific intent required for first-degree arson, so at most he should have been guilty of a lesser degree.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence was sufficient to convict Harnden of first-degree arson | State: circumstantial and direct evidence (choice of accelerant, pouring fluid, ignition, admissions, recorded phone call, lucid behavior) supports malicious intent | Harnden: self-induced intoxication prevented formation of the specific intent required for first-degree arson | Affirmed: jury could reasonably find malicious intent despite intoxication and convict of first-degree arson |
Key Cases Cited
- Keats v. State, 64 P.3d 104 (clarifies malice in first-degree arson encompasses acting without legal justification or with ill will)
- Hankinson v. State, 47 P.3d 623 (jury may infer specific intent from a defendant's conduct despite heavy intoxication)
- Pena v. State, 361 P.3d 862 (circumstantial evidence, including words and conduct, can establish intent)
- Faubion v. State, 233 P.3d 926 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Andersen v. State, 330 P.3d 256 (State's evidence accepted as true and given favorable inferences on review)
- Toth v. State, 353 P.3d 696 (same principle regarding appellate sufficiency review)
